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How is constitutional doctrine made? Why do some words
emerge as constitutional necessities while others fade from memory?
Even if we assume that all doctrine is and will continue to be formal,
why do courts choose the formalisms that they do? To these large
questions, there are no simple answers. Constitutional doctrine spills
from the pages of the federal reporters every day, covering oceans of
subject matter so vast that no single theory could possibly navigate it
all. And, yet, scholars have been trying of late to articulate theories of
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the modern doctrinal enterprise. From right, left, and in between,
they have recently joined hands to warn us of a "new formalism":
that, for better or worse, doctrine is becoming more, rather than less,
formal and, as a result, less accessible to the people. 1
This focus on the "new formalism" leaves a number of questions
unanswered about why we choose the doctrinal vocabularies that we
do. Consider a court that creates a new doctrinal rule by focusing on
a "clear and compelling interest" or the "reasonable expectations" of
the parties. 2 The court is not trying to be more formalistic or obscure;
indeed, the court is unlikely to be conscious of its doctrinal art.
Judges are too busy relying upon these terms to assume anything but
that doctrine may be made this way-that it is appropriate to focus
upon "interests" rather than "claims," or that there is great
significance in choosing the adjective "compelling" rather than
"substantial." Even if unconscious, these moves are nevertheless of
extraordinary importance. And perhaps because of their importance,
we find it difficult to remind ourselves that we are leaning upon
something contingene-that if the law books of the past fifty years

1 See Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence", 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147,
149 (1994) (decrying the increasing "bureaucratic" flavor of Supreme Court writing);
Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993)
(describing the Court as "trapped in the grips of mechanical jurisprudence"); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation:
Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 674-76 (1995)
("The Supreme Court's present style of constitutional discourse is the practical
equivalent ... of the Yangs' inarticulate grunts."); Richard A. Posner, judges' Writing
Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (1995) (criticizing the
"pure" style of opinion writing, with its multi-factor tests, as retarding the search for
real meaning); see also ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY
AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121-55 (1989) (arguing that modern constitutional doctrine is "formulaic"). But see Frederick Schauer, opinions as Rules, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1456-59 (1995) (agreeing with Professors Farber, Horwitz, and
Nagel that Supreme Court opinions have developed a bureaucratic, formulaic style,
but arguing that there is nothing particularly unfortunate about this).
2 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (describing the "compelling interest" test in religion clause
cases as barring "encroachments upon [religious] liberty, whether direct or indirect,
unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests" (citation omitted));
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (focusing
the question of whether there is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment on a
reasonable person's "expectation" of privacy).
' Cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 12e-14e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) (noting the error of
saying that we have a belief that the world started more than five minutes ago, a matter
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were destroyed by cataclysm or fire, many of our most revered
constitutional concepts would be gone.
Why is it that, if Justice Holmes were resurrected tomorrow, he
would need a translator of sorts to explain the new world of
constitutional tests and factors and scrutinies? Would it be enough to
explain that doctrine had simply become "formulaic" or
"bureaucratic" or "methodologically obsessed"? 4 In what follows, I
consider a different hypothesis: Doctrine is not simply random wordchoice, but reflected job description. If doctrine has changed, it has
changed because the modern Court sees its institutional strengths
and weaknesses differently than it did in an earlier era. Mter a
century spent debunking the common law ideal5 in the name of
"realism,"6 it would be odd, indeed, if modern constitutional doctrine
on which few will have formulated a belief, not because the fact is doubted, but
because we are too busy relying upon it to go about doubting it).
• See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 1, at 128 (describing the modern formulaic style as
"an amalgam of the bureaucratic and the academic"); Farber, supra note 1, at 150-52
(describing the bureaucratic features of modern constitutional doctrine); Horwitz,
supra note 1, at 98-99 (arguing that contemporary Supreme Court opinions are dense
with various "methodological obsessions").
5
See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 21, 165, 170-225 (1993) (recounting the sea change over the century in
the ideas "taught in [law] schools, practiced in [law] firms, and made by judges in
courts" away from a pragmatic program that viewed the work "of lawyers through the
prism of the common law"); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 104
(1977) ("In the 1970s we look back on an unpleasant half century which has been
largely devoted to destroying the illusions which had commended themselves to the
men of the 1870s.").
' Let me emphasize at the outset that I am using the term "realism" in its popularized sense. By that, I refer to a set of ideas that have filtered through legal education
as "realism," however crude or naive these ideas may seem when compared to the
actual historical record. On realism generally and its influence on legal thought and
education, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 49 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993)
(compiling and summarizing selected original sources viewed today as essential to the
Realist movement); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159, 65
(1995) ("American legal realism is one of the great paradoxes of modern jurisprudence. No other jurisprudential tendency of the twentieth century has exerted such a
powerful influence on legal thinking while remaining so ambiguous, unsettled and
undefined."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-268 (1992) ("The most important legacy
of Realism ... was its challenge to the orthodox claim that legal thought was separate
and autonomous from moral and political discourse."); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 3, 33-34 (1986) ("The [legal] realists pointed to the role
of human idiosyncracy in legal decision making, stressed the uselessness of legal rules
and concepts, and emphasized the importance of greater efficiency and certainty in
law administration."); and KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 185-225 (stating that "[w]hat the
realists all opposed was the conception of legal science that Langdell had offered as a
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had not become self-conscious of the possibility of doctrinal failure.
What has gone unnoticed, however, is how courts' new selfconsciousness has influenced constitutional doctrine itself-how
courts' embrace of the scrutiny of interests rather than the assertion
of powers, their fondness for methodological queries rather than
seriatim citation, reflects a peculiarly modern 7 institutional self-doubt.
In other words, our answer to the resurrected Justice Holmes may be
that doctrinal rhetoric has changed, at least in part, because this
century has witnessed a revolution in courts' image of themselves and
of doctrine itself.
In what follows, I consider three examples of modern
constitutional doctrine that show how judges have stolen bits and
pieces from popularized skepticisms about the job of judging and
have molded this stolen rhetoric into doctrine. In the first example, I
ask whether constitutional law's recent penchant for doctrinal rules
based on "clear law" could have existed without the modern age's
obsession with legal uncertainty. 8 In the second, I consider whether
our contemporary rhetoric of constitutional "interests" and
"expectations" reflects modern critiques of doctrine as failing to
address social needs. 9 In the third, I ask how an offhand reference to
the term "fundamental" could come to describe a legal category
defined by courts' own fears of illegitimacy except in an age selfconscious of the judiciary's institutional weaknesses. 10 If I am right
about these examples, it may be that what was once said of modern
painting's abstraction-that whatever else it was about, it was "'about
painting"' 11 -is true of modern doctrine's abstraction as well: that it

model for the work of the new law school professoriate that he himself did so much to
create").
7
I use the term "modern" despite our advancement to a postmodern age since I
believe that the doctrinal institution's sense of legitimacy hails from a period earlier
than our own, a period in which judges of the post-war period received their legal
education. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 87 ("And it should be borne in mind that
what is taught in the law schools in one generation will be widely believed by the bar in
the following generation.").
8 See infra Part II (discussing the development of rules governing constitutional
remedies that require courts to dismiss the constitutional claim if the right claimed is
not "clearly established").
9 See infra Part III (discussing doctrinal rules that depend upon the "expectations"
or "interests" of the parties).
10 See infra Part IV (discussing contemporary readings of Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
u.s. 535 (1942)).
11
David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656, 1661 (1986) (quoting
STANLEY CAVELL, MusicDiswmposed, in MUST WE MEANWHATWESAY? 207 (1969)).
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is about doctrine and doctrine's struggle in an age self-conscious of
the possibility of doctrinal failure.
Obviously, these three examples cannot prove that doctrinal
rhetoric reflects a history of shifting institutional ideals or that
doctrine has absorbed a kind of institutional self-criticism. But as
long as theories are being constructed, 12 I think it is worth
considering an approach that neither romanticizes past ages nor
repeats familiar criticisms. 13 Modern constitutional doctrine presents
an important question of collective action: How do large groups of
people end up speaking the same constitutional language when that
language changes over time? One plausible answer is that doctrine is
a practice that develops within institutions, not simply as the random
acts of individual judges. 14 Indeed, those who study institutions from
a distance have long understood that institutions are maintained,
over time, by squeezing ideas into a common shape, a shape that
carries forward, unacknowledged, an ideal picture of the institution. 15
These ideals become the default image, sustaining the institution's
perceived identity relative to other institutions. When those images
are challenged, the institution uses its traditional methods (here, the
doctrinal category) to tame the critique, but, in doing so,
recapitulates the institutional challenge (here, within the doctrine
created).
In Part I, I set my position in context, surveying briefly those who
have tried to capture modern doctrinal practice in larger
constitutional frames. In Parts II, III, and IV, I recount three
different doctrinal histories, arguing that each has been
fundamentally shaped by courts' self-consciousness of the failures of a

12 See supra note 1.
" See infra Part I (arguing that many contemporary complaints about "formulaic"
doctrine repeat arguments made at the beginning of the century by the realists).
14
See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1989, 2030 (1996) ("OJurisprudence tends to speak of 'the judge,' as if America had
only one of them, operating in lordly isolation."); see also PHILIP BOBBITI,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 163-70, 179 (1991) (arguing that constraints on
judging emanate from rules of practice shared by the judiciary as a whole).
15
See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 55 ( 1986) (" [F] or discourse to be
possible at all, the basic categories have to be agreed on. Nothing else but institutions
can define sameness. Similarity is an institution. Elements get assigned to sets where
institutions find their own analogies in nature."); see also MARTHA MIN OW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 79-80 ( 1990) (agreeing
with Douglas that" [i]nstitutions establish what count as correct and incorrect patterns
of thought").
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common law ideal of judging. 16
As the histories show, by
doctrinalizing the critique (for example, by cabining the critique of
indeterminacy in a rule that depends upon finding "unclear law"),
this method accomplishes two seemingly incompatible ends:
Doctrine (1) acknowledges critique; and (2) cabins it within
categorical boundaries, leaving a place, outside those boundaries,
where older ideals may flourish (where law is indeed "clear"). The
result is that, when we go to draw the doctrinal lines, we find
ourselves enmeshed in difficult questions of institutional identity (to
apply the "clear law" rule, for example, we end up having to decide
what counts as "law" 17 ). I conclude in Part V by suggesting that, if
doctrinal practice 18 operates like other social institutions, we should
expect to see doctrine trying to respond to its critics, including the
"realist" ones/ 9 even if this effort recapitulates familiar struggles. 20 If
there is a certain inevitability to all this, there are also obvious
dangers. Cases themselves cannot be skeptical; inevitably, courts

16
Only in the past few years have scholars attempted to reverse the century's
hostility toward common law decisionmaking ideals in constitutional law. See CAss R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 77-79 (1996) ("To the extent
that the common law generally respects freedom of contract, private property, and
private ordering, it has many virtues from the standpoint of efficiency. Common law
judgments also reflect intelligible understandings of liberty."); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (promoting the
common law approach to understanding American constitutional law).
17 See infra Part II (discussing issues raised by the "clear law" rule).
18
What I mean by "practice" is simply that doctrine is something that people "do"
as well as a set of directives or rules. And, as something that people "do," doctrine
(like any other practice) is subject to the incentives and limits of the institutional
structures in which it is created, structures that reflect both the nature of courts
(doctrine's site) relative to other institutions, as well as influences from other, less
formal, legal institutions such as the academy (doctrine's antagonist). See infra Part V.
To see that doctrine is itself an institution acknowledges the ultimate power of the
three principal decisionmaking institutions (courts, legislatures, and administration)
to shape legal culture, but it rejects the notion that we have three, and only three,
legal institutions worth studying.
19 I do not say this to blame theory, or realism, for doctrine's failures.
(To the
extent my own work relies on empirical analysis, see Victoria Nourse, Passion 5 Progress:
Modem Law &form and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331 (1997), it falls in a
direct line from realist premises.) I say it to try to give new life to something that Karl
Llewellyn once wisely insisted upon-an understanding of law as an institution. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1934)
("Every living constitution is an institution .... ").
20 As Mary Douglas has explained, when we choose particular concepts, we are
"also picking and choosing at the same time their allies and opponents and the
pattern of their future relations," a process that tends to cause arguments to repeat
themselves in different rhetorical guises. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 63.
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•
decide. 21 A court that truly seeks to incorporate th1s
century ' s
"realism"-that assumes all doctrine is uncertain or relative-cannot
decide. A court that tames some popular critiques by putting
conceptual edges around them (for example, by turning
indeterminacy into a doctrinal search for "unclear" law) may still
come to a resolution, but stops along the way to engage in a battle
about its own image that may be unnecessary and divertingly selfinvolved. The danger here is that a court will mistake its own
institutional struggles for the real-life struggles of the litigants before
it, replacing the nineteenth century's constitutional arrogance with a
modern constitutional narcissism.

I. STUDYING MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Contemporary scholarship has devoted little effort to considering
the ways courts make constitutional doctrine. If we put to the side,
for the moment, normative critiques of particular doctrines 22 and
focus on efforts to take a more general view, three approaches stand
out. First, there are those who have sought to identify a modern style
of opinionwriting, and whose efforts have been largely, although not
uniformly, critical of an increasingly "formulaic" doctrine. 23 Second,
there are those who have emphasized the Supreme Court's audience
and, again, who have been largely critical of the ways in which
modern constitutional doctrine excludes "we the people."24 Finally,
there are those who have focused on constitutional rhetoric, arguing
that the real object of study should be neither aesthetics nor
audience, but rather the ways in which doctrine masks and shapes as
it persuades. 25 Unfortunately, although each of these approaches has
something to say about how doctrine is made, none provides us with a
ready answer as to why modern doctrine looks and feels "different"

21
The "case" brings to bear pressures different in nature and kind from those
brought to bear on the reasoning processes of markets, legislatures, or bureaucracies.
See NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATiVES 125-28 (1994) (comparing the institutional biases of markets, legislatures, and courts). It requires a decision. See BOBBITT,
supra note 14, at 183 (noting that cases "require a decision, not a calculation or an
interpretation, or even a passionate conviction").
22
Some of these, of course, have been extraordinarily powerful. See, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 943-44
(1987) (exploring and evaluating "a form of constitutional reasoning-balancingthat has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades").
" See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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from that of earlier eras. Indeed, each approach, in its own way,
seems vaguely repetitive of arguments borrowed from an earlier era. 26
A. Style, Audience, Rhetoric

To the extent scholars have tried to enumerate a modern
constitutional style, 27 they have focused on what Professor Nagel
insightfully dubbed, almost a decade ago, the "formulaic
constitution."28 The idea that modern constitutional doctrine has
acquired a peculiarly formalistic style was echoed in 1993 by Professor
Horwitz in an incisive discussion of the Supreme Court's term, 29 and
again, recently, in elegant essays by Professor Farber,so Professor
Schauer,31 and Judge Posner. 32 These scholars are surely right that
part of the reason that modern doctrine looks and feels different is its
layered reasoning style, 33 with its dull penchant for what Professor

26 Recently, Professors Rubin and Feeley have suggested a phenomenological
approach to the "making" of doctrine which may prove a powerful new addition to the
debate, but has yet to percolate through the academy. To some extent, my focus on
institutions fits well with their approach, although my historical efforts are quite
distinct from theirs. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 14, at 1991 (presenting a "theory
ofjudicial lawmaking ... based upon phenomenology").
27 Llewellyn seems to have been right when he cautioned that "'[s]tyle' in analysis
of great-institutions, is tricky. It needs vigilance lest it move into ... word-slinging."
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 519 n.16
(1960).
28 NAGEL, supra note 1, at 121.
29 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 98 ("[M]ost of this Court's opinions ... [make]
amazingly fine distinctions that produce multiple opinions designated in Parts, subparts, and sub-sub-parts .... "). But see Schauer, supra note 1, at 1459-66 (arguing
against the idea that there is anything so terrible about opinions that bear such a
"style").
"' See Farber, supra note 1, at 150 ("Bluntly, much of what the Court produces
these days lacks the qualities of good legal writing.").
" See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1457-59 (acknowledging the descriptive accuracy of
claims concerning the "formulaic" style but arguing against the idea that such a style
hinders constitutional decisionmaking).
52 See Posner, supra note 1, at 1429-32 (concluding that most contemporary judicial
opinions are in the "pure style," a style that is neither plain nor transparent, but
artificial, technical, and impersonal).
" Much of the recent discussion on the "style" question, from both the left and
the right, has focused on the "layered look" of modern constitutional doctrine. See,
e.g., NAGEL, supra note 1, at 128 (arguing that the Court's formulae share characteristics of "administrative rules and guidelines ... [b]oth are complex, layered and
equivocal"); Horwitz, supra note 1, at 98 (arguing that the Court's product has acquired a "thick undergrowth of technicality," "[w]ith three and four 'prong' tests
everywhere and for everything; with an almost medieval earnestness about
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Farber has termed the "inscrutable instructions" that typically
Each author has provided a rich
accompany tax forms. 34
understanding of the aesthetics of modern opinionwriting in
constitutional and other cases. On the other hand, identifYing
"formulas-as-formulas" as the distinctive feature of modern doctrine 35
does not move us much beyond the realists' own screeds against
formulaic conceptualism. 36 Mter a century of doctrinal criticism,
must our understanding stop with the notion that constitutional
doctrine is "formulaic"?
Those seeking a modern constitutional style are not the only ones
who have sought to examine doctrinal forms by taking a longer view.
A number of scholars who otherwise share little in intellectual interest
or temperament have suggested that we need to look at constitutional
doctrine as a form of argument directed to particular audiences. 37
Although reaching no uniform conclusion, some of the most incisive
work argues that modern constitutional doctrine has little
consciousness of its audience, and, as a result, fails to communicate
an "intelligible constitution."38 No doubt this is true, just as it is true

classification and categorization"); see also Farber, supra note 1, at 149 (echoing these
concerns).
" Farber, supra note 1, at 152.
" See NAGEL, supra note 1, at 121 (arguing that "the formulaic style is one of the
few basic fixtures" of modern constitutional doctrine).
'" See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 57 (1936) ("We lawyers are
still held in the bonds of 'holy words' in the form of rules, principles, formulas and
standards, reduced to well-polished phrases." (referring to the claims of Leon
Green)); id. at 118 (decrying "the insistent effort to achieve predictability by the
attempt to mechanize law, to reduce it to formulas"); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudenc!!-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 439 (1930) ("The statement 'this is
the rule' typically means: 'I find this formula of words in authoritative books.'"); see also
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 208 ("In much of the critical literature of Legal Realism,
conceptualism is identified as the primary disease, accused of causing intellectual
distortion in situations where there might otherwise be clear expressions of reality.").
" Emphasis on "audience" can be found in a variety of works, including those that
emphasize the "formulaic" style or "rhetorical" approaches. See, e.g, NAGEL, supra note
1, at 154-55 (arguing that the "formulaic" style tends to make the Court's work inaccessible to a public audience); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION at xiv, 11
(1990) (arguing that the law is a "branch of rhetoric" and, as a "professional discourse," has a "specialized audience" that shapes that rhetoric); see also Sanford
Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial opinion, in LAW'S STORIES 187, 199-200 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices expect their
opinions "to be read by multiple audiences").
"" The phrase is Joseph Goldstein's in his book of the same title. See JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992); see also Burke Marshall, Foreword
to THE INTElliGIBLE CONSTITUTION supra, at xvii ("Familiarity with the Court's work
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that modern doctrine bears the shopworn look of doctrine-by-order.
But there is something less than satisfYing about the claim that the
"people are being left out" if we are trying to identifY a distinctively
modern doctrine. 39 Mter all, would the average man on the street in
1935 have been any less bewildered when confronted with the idea of
the "police power" than would a woman on the street in 1997 asked
about the Edwards-Rnberson standard? 40 Again, we find ourselves
making arguments that sound very much like the realists' derisive
claims about "lawyers' language." 41
Finally, there are those who have chosen, quite rightly, to view
doctrine with an emphasis on rhetorical understandings. 42 Although
this work is often illuminating, it is quite diverse, borrowing from a
variety of traditions. 43 Thus we learn that doctrine is constructed
overwhelmingly demonstrates at a minimum that the members of the Court view their
work as directed at the elite, and not to the people.").
•• I tend to agree with Professor Goldstein that we might have a better
constitutional grammar if in fact the "people" felt as if they could participate in
constitutional arguments, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 6 ("If Ours is to be an
'intelligent democracy,' if Our revolutions are to be peaceful, We the People ... must
be able to learn, from Our own reading of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's
construction of it, what rights We have and do not have .... "), but I am not persuaded
that modern doctrine is any more inaccessible to the masses today than in earlier days
or that, if it were, that would tell us much about why we create the doctrine that we do.
See Schauer, supra note I, at I463 (noting that "ordinary people simply do not read
judicial opinions").
40
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 4I2 (1990) (discussing Edwards-Roberson limitations, which limit police authority to interrogate a suspect once she has invoked the
right to counsel).
41 See FRANK, supra note 36, at 22-24 (using the layman's derisive attitude toward
"lawyers' language" as part of his realist critique).
42 I use "rhetorical understandings" here to encompass not only an aesthetic-as
would a "style"-but also to encompass "reasoning" processes aimed at persuasion,
whether that persuasion is defined politically or as a reflection of reason. See, e.g., J.M.
Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendentjustice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 118I
(1994) (discussing rhetoric as a form of"persuasive advocacy"); Posner, supra note I,
at I422 (distinguishing rhetoric from style because rhetoric connotes a reasoning
process aimed at persuasion).
" The diversity in the approaches is apparent from even a short list of those
exploring law's rhetoric. See e.g., J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal
Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 37, at 211, 2I6-18
(equating the semiotician's point that law consists of "standard pro and con
responses" for every legal argument with the idea of "topics" in classical rhetoric);
Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the Rhetoric of
judicial Review, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 225, 227 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1994) (arguing that constitutional interpretation reflects a rhetoric "of
legitimation," in which "instabilities" of interpretation are "ceaselessly concealed and
revealed, displaced and declaimed"); Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law: Reflections on
the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 37, at 225, 226 (exploring
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rather than given, malleable and obscuring rather than fixed and
transparent, but we uncover few clues about why particular doctrines
emerge, gain currency, and die. 44 For example, in his essay The Law
Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, Stanley Fish embraces doctrine's
formal ingenuity, celebrating rather than decrying the ways in which
law aspires to an autonomous existence distinct from morality or
science. 45 Rejecting the despairing conclusions of much critical
scholarship, Fish argues that doctrine's failings and inconsistencies
"enable[] law to work." 46
Ultimately, however, this welcome
contrarianism avoids the question I am trying to answer about the
choice of particular doctrinal forms. At the end of the essay, Fish
himself recognizes this, telling us that he has not "chart[ed] in any
detail any of the differently contingent courses the law has taken in
the areas it has marked out for its own." 47 Thus, although his analysis
may provide clues about doctrinal formulation at an abstract level, it
avoids the particulars. In doing so, it leaves us wondering whether
Fish's critique is simply an updated celebratory version of the old
claim that law reflects the social and moral predilections of its
authors, dressed up in fancy vocabularies. 48

B. Caveats
Before I go any further, a few caveats are in order. Taking
doctrine seriously poses several hazards of misunderstanding. 49 To

rhetoric as the assertion of authority, the constituting of "our social universe through
the language of the law" in the context of status discourse); see also James Boyd White,
Law as Rheturic, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 684, 690-92 (1985) (emphasizing the ways in which legal language is a
"constitutive rhetoric" creating a specific vision of"community").
" There are important exceptions, of course. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of
Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2117-21 (1996)
(showing the "preseiVation through transformation" of a status regime in the history
of doctrinal rules governing violence against women).
45
See STANLEY FISH, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THERE'S NO SUCH
THINGASFREESPEECHANDIT'SAGOODTHING, TOO 141 (1994).
46 /d. at 169.
47
/d. at 178.
48
See id. at 156 ("That is to say-and in so saying I rehearse the essence of my
argument-the law is continually creating and recreating itself out of the very
materials and forces it is obliged, by the very desire to be law, to push away.").
49
One need only look at the pages of the leading law reviews to see evidence of
"theory-orthodoxy." A LEXIS search for all articles published in the last decade that
have the word "theory" in the title is incapable of completion because the search yields
more than 1,000 documents.
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many in the academy, doctrine is an undifferentiated mass of rules
similar in concept and uninteresting in detail. For them, the
interesting question is, why formalism? 50 On the opposite side of this
divide sit practitioners and judges whose job descriptions compel
them to focus on the question of "which" doctrine applies. 5 1 In this
Article, I ask a different question: why this doctrine as opposed to
another? This assumes, of course, that doctrines have histories, that
they emerge, gain currency, and may die. Although difficult to prove,
this statement resonates with most lawyers' and academics' daily use
and understanding of doctrine. 52 It is also consistent with our
understandings of law and language in general. Imagine, for
example, that we could magically resurrect Justice Holmes and set
him down with volume 483 of the United States Reports. We can be
fairly sure that, as he flipped the pages, his brow might furrow upon

50
The debate on such issues is so widely dispersed as to defy a footnote. However,
for some interesting approaches, highlighting the differing uses of the term formalism,
see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 8 (1983) ("A legal
system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dictated by demonstrative
(rationally compelling) reasoning."); MichaelS. Moore, The Semantics ofjudging, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 151, 154 (1981) ("Formalism is essentially a theory of adjudication.");
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 181 (1986) ("Formalism enables a
commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in
approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical problem can be
pronounced correct or incorrect."); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509,
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies
the concept of decisionmaking according to rule."); and Ernest J. Weinrib, The
jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 583 (1993)
("Formalism is a theory of legal justification.").
51
On the growing distance between academia and the bar, see Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv.
34, 34-42 (1992) (bemoaning this growing distance). But see Richard A. Posner, The
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921, 1921-28
(1993) (disagreeing with Edwards's views about contemporary legal scholarship).
52 Scholars working from widely different positions have acknowledged the
temporal dimensions of our categories, doctrinal and otherwise. See, e.g., Charles
Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1140, 1152 (1994) ("[T]here are the
rhythms and sequences by which doctrine ... is brought into being, elaborated,
modified, and perhaps eventually abandoned."); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 98 (1984) ("[T]he most elementary categories that
people use to organize everyday life, are culturally and historically contingent; that is,
they are specific to given places and times."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 215-16 (1979) ("Categorical schemes
have a life of their own.").
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encountering "quasi-suspect classes,"53 "Witherspoon-excludable"54
jurors, and the "effects prong of the Lemon test." 55 He might ask what
happened to the "police power,"56 "vested rights," 57 or "class
legislation."58 Surely, however, he would recognize that law's working
vocabulary, its language, and perhaps even its grammar, had
changed.

" See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (noting the Court's earlier
rejection in Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986), of the notion that close relatives
should be treated as a quasi-suspect class).
" See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 407 n.6, 415 ( 1987) (referring to
jurors properly excluded under guidelines set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968)).
55 See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347 (1987) (O'Connor,]., concurring in
judgment) (disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of the '"effects' prong of the
Lemon test").
56 By the end of the nineteenth century, the "police power had become the
standard legal category for talking about the state's regulatory power over the health,
safety, and morals of its citizens." HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 27. For an overview of the
development of the concept of the police power during the nineteenth century and
up until 1934, see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 153-73, 285-300 (3d ed. 1992). For an in-depth analysis of the
"police power" with a revisionist bent, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED 61-146 (1993) (focusing on the Court's concern with "class" legislation in its
police power decisions).
57 During the first century of its development, "the core of general constitutional
law was the vested rights doctrine." BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 56, at 105-09, 291;
see also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 305, 316-17 ( 1988) (discussing the concept of "vested rights").
58
"Class legislation" was a term of art used in late-nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury opinions to refer to legislation that sought "to favor special interests at the
expense of the public interest." HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 23; see GILLMAN, supra note
56, at 61-99 (redescribing pre-Lochnerequal protection decisions in terms of the "class
legislation" principle); see also, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885) (stating
that "class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited"
by the Fourteenth Amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) ("What
is called class legislation ... would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). The idea of class legislation was incorporated into the basic standard
governing the police power. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)
(noting that to justify the exercise of the police power, "it must appear ... that the
interest~ of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference"). Such legislation was also deemed "partial." See, e.g.,
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1889) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment "does undoubtedly prohibit discriminating and partial
legislation by any State"). This principle appeared in constitutional law treatises as a
viable category of constitutional law until at least 1929.
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Once we accept the notion that constitutional rhetoric has
changed, it seems only right to consider why this might be so. 59
Doctrine's sheer "ubiquity" has made its study difficult, but
"underscores the need for a theory of its operation," as Professors
Rubin and Feeley recently have suggested. 60 At least in constitutional
law, most have come to accept Philip Bobbitt's insight that there are
different "forms" of argument and that "doctrinal argument" is one of
those forms. 61 A number of questions remain, however, about the
ever-changing appearance of such arguments.
In what follows, I offer three case studies, intended less as the
final word on doctrinal creation than as illuminating excerpts from a
complex constitutional history.
I proceed much the way an
anthropologist or historian might-as if the entire doctrinal culture
were strange to me, employing the device of a "foreign observer" to
aid the investigation. 62 In this world, the received wisdom about
doctrine has disappeared and we are free to ask whether it might have
been different. This stance helps to isolate the act of doctrinal
creation from the substantive merits of the controversy, and at the
same time allows the study of doctrinal formulations at work. I leave
the world of "big" theory for one of "thick" description, of "local"
knowledge of a doctrinal practice. 63

59
Even those scholars committed to the idea that doctrinal argument is "political"
have their own stories about the history of doctrine. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 52, at
116-25 (defending the historical study from a critical perspective).
•• Rubin & Feeley, supra note 14, at 1990.
61 PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 39-58 (1982) (describing and analyzing
the doctrinal form of argument). But see].M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1778 (1994) (acknowledging Bobbitt's grammar, but
rejecting his distinction between "legitimacy and justification" as applied to that grammar).
•• This approach is not standard doctrinal criticism, but neither is it
unprecedented. See WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
250 (1973) (discussing Llewellyn's "claim[] that he read his samples of opinions in
much the same way" that historians read historical documents).
•• The terms "thick" and "local" are terms borrowed from anthropology which
have found homes in legal scholarship as well. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 45, at 171 ("A
rhetorical jurisprudence does not ask timeless questions; it inquiries [sic] into the
local conditions of persuasion, into the reasons that work .... "). On "local" knowledge
as used in anthropology, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 215 (1983) ("Law ... is local knowledge, local not
just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent-vernacular
characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can.").

1997]

MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

1415

II. THE SEARCH FOR "CLEAR LAw"

If one is doubtful that modern constitutional doctrine has
changed, one only has to look at the increasing incidence and
importance of doctrinal rules that depend unashamedly upon the
concept of legal "clarity" itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the
Supreme Court has created so many doctrines requiring an inquiry
about whether a right or power is "clear" or "unclear" that
"commentators can [hardly] keep track of them. "64 Today, "clear law"
presents a threshold question in every constitutional tort case,65 many
habeas corpus petitions, 66 and some exclusionary rule claims. 67 A
similar emphasis on legal clarity now governs Tenth Amendment
cases,68 Eleventh Amendment cases, 69 as we II as statutory
interpretation 70 and administrative law cases. 71 If, like the realists, we
64
John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Ckar Statement
Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 771, 771 (referring to "clear statement rules" in a variety of
contexts); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel]. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1991) (tracking a similar
development of "clear law" rules in the context of constitutional remedies); Linda
Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467 (1996) (analyzing
clear law developments in qualified immunity and other contexts).
65
See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (applying clear law standard
to§ 1983 claim against state official); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(holding that Bivens actions against federal officials are governed by the clear law
standard).
66
See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-06 (1989) (stating that habeas
petitioners may not rest claims upon "new rules"); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
414 (1990) (interpreting Teague as saying that the "'new rule' principle ... validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions").
" See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) ("Nor can a law enforcement
officer be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statue if its provisions are
such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional.").
•• See, e.g., Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,464 (1991) ("Application ofthe plain
statement rule thus may avoid a potential constitutional problem.").
69
See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,786 (1991) (stating
that the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity "can only be exercised by
a clear legislative statement"); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) ("Lest
Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area of
the law, evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual.").
70
See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (announcing that
the Court's task is "to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted
has a plain, unambiguous meaning").
71 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (stating that an administrative agency may enforce a rule that
is a "reasonable" interpretation of a statute even if a court would find that interpretation to be incorrect).
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are to define formalism as the false aspiration to doctrinal clarity and
certainty, 72 it seems difficult to deny that the increasing incidence of
these rules reflects a new formality. One searches in vain for an
example of a doctrinal rule created before 1945 in which the certainty
and clarity of law itself played such an important and unabashed
doctrinal role.
A. The Meaning of "Clear Law"

A foreign observer, aware of just a small amount of legal history,
might become quite perplexed as she came upon these doctrines.
She would note that, for much of the century, scholars and lawyers
had challenged the idea that there was anything remotely like "clear
law." Indeed, at the beginning of this century, the realists warned of
the futility of "[c]ertainty-hunger and other superstitio[ns]."73 And
yet, as we approach the year 2000, we find doctrine dripping off the
pages of the federal reporters seeking "clearly established law," 74
"unequivocally express[ed] intent,"75 and, of course, "plain
meaning." 76 How could it be, in an age where some have come to
believe that we are "all realists," 77 that doctrine should hunger so
openly for "clear law"?
A native speaker of constitutional law would point the puzzled
observer to cases such as Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 18 a constitutional tort
action decided at the beginning of the 1980s. Harlow stands at the
72
FRANK, supra note 36, at 3-13, 18 (decrying the "basic legal myth" of legal clarity
as a "childish" and "unrealistic notion that law is, or can be made, entirely certain and
definitely predictable").
73
ld. at 87; see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812 (1935) (despairing that the law's language is "entirely
useless" when it comes to actual prediction oflegal phenomenon).
" See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (limiting liability for
constitutional torts to conduct that "violate[s] clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
75 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (holding
that Congress waives Eleventh Amendment immunity only in cases where its intent to
do so is "unequivocally express[ed]").
76
See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (announcing that
the Court's task is "to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted
has a plain, unambiguous meaning").
77 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1985)
("[T]he received learning has been that legal analysis cannot be neutral and determinate, that general propositions of law cannot decide particular cases.");Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467, 467 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra
note 6) ("We are all legal realists now.").
78 457 u.s. 800 (1982).
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end of a long line of cases establishing that federal and state officials
are immune from damage liability for constitutional violations if they
can show that their conduct was undertaken in good faith. 79 The
Harlow Court, nervous about the increasing use of the tort remedy,
focused on the subjectivity of the inquiry demanded by a rule based
on "good faith," and decided to solve the problem by adopting a
'llore stringent standard. Good faith, the Court announced, was not
to be measured by the defendant's malice or intention, but by an
objective standard based on
"clearly established law."80
Henceforward, government officials would be "shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct [did] not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights." 81
Had the clear law rule stopped with Harlow, few might have taken
note. But, within the next decade and a half, the clear law rhetoric
would emerge far afield from its origins. From constitutional torts,
the clear law language moved to the exclusionary rule. In Illinois v.
Krull, the Court held that illegally obtained evidence would not be
excluded at trial if the statute authorizing the seizure was not clearly
unconstitutional, 82 analogizing a constitutional ambiguity to the kind
of good-faith search affirmed by the Court in United States v. Leon. 83
From the exclusionary rule, the clear law rule moved to a new
remedial field-habeas corpus. In the celebrated 1989 decision of
Teag;ue v. Lane, the Supreme Court barred habeas petitions based on
"new rules," 84 a phrase later defined by the Court, in Butler v.
McKellar, 85 as the set of rules upon which state judges could in good
faith rely, again invoking Leon. Mter Butler, the price of a habeas

79 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) ("We hold that the defense of
good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the
officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available
to them in the action under § 1983. ").
80
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
81
I d. at 818.
82
480 U.S. 340, 355-60 (1987) (applying the "good faith" exception created by
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and holding that, even if a statute
authorizing warrantless administrative searches was unconstitutional, a police officer's
good-faith reliance on that statute would bar application of the exclusionary rule); see
also id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the decision today ... courts are
expected to determine at what point a reasonable officer should be held to know that
a statute has, under evolving legal rules, become 'clearly' unconstitutional.").
"' 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (creating a good-faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
84 489 u.s. 288, 310 (1989).
85
494 u.s. 407, 414 (1990).
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petition was legal clarity: If state judges might reasonably disagree
about the appropriate legal ruling, the rule sought was deemed
"new," and the petition would be denied. 86 And, just last year,
Congress embraced its own version of the clear law principle,
declaring in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 that state judges' reasonable interpretations of "clearly
established" constitutional law would not be subject to review in a
habeas application. 87
The rule of clear law seems to offer lawyers and judges a simple
equation: Find unclarity in the law and you have solved the case-or
at least a very large part of it. Judges may dismiss the constitutional
tort claim, find the state official immune from suit, or deny a habeas
petition as long as the court finds the law "unclear." In practice,
however, this simple equation has proven extremely difficult to apply.
The questions are obvious, yet perplexing. How clear must clear be?
Is a rule clear if the principle it announces is clear, even though
application to particular facts may be uncertain? What counts as law
for the purposes of determining clear or unclear law? In the
remedial context, 88 these questions quickly multiply. Do conflicts in
another circuit or between a circuit court and a district court count?
What if the conflicting decisions are unpublished? 89 Is "the case" its
holding, its facts, or its announced rule? 90 As the Supreme Court has

86
In his Butlerdissent,Justice Brennan summarized the connection between clear
law and new rules. See id. at 417-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A legal ruling sought by
a federal habeas petitioner is now deemed 'new' as long as the correctness of the
rule ... is 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.' Put another way, a state
prisoner can secure habeas relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the
constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that
the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.'' (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1734-35, 1752
(equating, for some purposes, Teague's "new rule" doctrine with the "clearly
established" law doctrine of the qualified immunity cases).
87 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
" By this I refer to the clear law rules applicable in the context of constitutional
torts, habeas, and some exclusionary rule claims. The courts' demand for a clear
statement in Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment cases focuses on the
clarity of expression of legislatures, rather than courts, and thus invites questions
about the collective meanings of other institutions.
89 See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) (arguing that
unpublished decisions may be relied upon because they are likely to be
uncontroversial and, therefore, create "no new precedent").
90
Several scholars have noted these difficulties. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified
Immunity: A User's Manua~ 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 199-205 (1993) (surveying courts'
approaches to determining whether a right is "clearly established"); Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 64, at 1751-53 (noting problems of specificity and authority in determining
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already recognized, if generality counts, all law may be clear; but, if
specificity counts, then no law may be clear91 for these purposes.
In its remedial contexts, the clear law rule invites questions
ranging from the mundanely difficult to the metaphysical. 92 There
are questions of geography (do decisions in other circuits make the
law clear?) ,93 questions of timing (do decisions unnoticed until after
the fact make the law clear?) ,94 and questions of scope (how closely
must a precedent fit with the facts to find it controllingly clear?). 95 At
this point, our foreign observer-unwedded to these decisions or
their place in the constitutional order-might begin to wonder why
judges are trying to answer these rather heady questions. Do judges
really need to develop a metatheory of law, legal change, and legal
rules to decide tort cases? If the Court's purpose in creating these
rules was to limit the number of frivolous constitutional claims or to
slow the pace of legal change,96 there seem far easier ways to achieve
those ends. The Court might have created procedural barriers (a
'"the state of the law"' required by clear law rules (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982))); Meyer, supra note 64, at 1505-11 (discussing the "level of
generality" and the "multiple sovereigns" problems).
"' See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) ("The operation of this
[objective legal reasonableness] standard ... depends substantially upon the level of
generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified."); see also Meyer, supra
note 64, at 1507-10 (discussing the dilemma surrounding "levels of generality" as
addressed by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in two recent conflicting holdings).
92
On the difficulty of the jurisprudential questions raised, see generally Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1758 (noting that decisions about the clarity of legal change
"raise profound issues of jurisprudential theory"), and Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say
Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 423,459-76 (1994) (discussing how
Teague's new rule doctrine relies on theories of precedent, borrowed from the positive
law and common law).
"' See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1175-77 (6th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that decisions of other circuits cannot establish "clear law"
except in the extraordinary case).
94
See, e.g., Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the court was applying a 1993 precedent to show that the law was clearly
established in 1991, when the incident happened); see also Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S.
510, 512-16 (1994) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's position that precedent unnoticed by
the district court was too late to be relevant to the "clear law" question).
95
See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (acknowledging that most legal rights are
"clearly established" at some level of generality and that plaintiffs could defeat the rule
of qualified immunity simply by alleging violation of an abstract legal right); Martin,
106 F.3d at 1312-13 (reversing the district court's determination that the law was
unclear based on a series of opinions from various district and appellate courts by
redescribing the right at a more general level-as the right to be free from excessive
force rather than the right to be free from "excessively forceful handcuffing").
96
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1793 n.327 (summarizing the frivolous
claims argument); id. at 1798 n.355 (summarizing the law-freezing argument).
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particularly stringent pleading rule, for example), or might simply
have decided the constitutional questions. Mter all, the Court
premised its embrace of clear law on the assumption that many of
these claims were "insubstantial."97 If there are easier ways, then what
does it mean that courts seem to be taking the harder path by trying
to define legal clarity? And trying so hard in so very many places?

B. justice as Clarity
Our foreign observer might suggest, at this point, that the rule of
clear law is peculiarly self-conscious: Doctrine itself has become an
object of judicial study. Rather than asking the question, "What
constitutional norms should decide this issue?", courts are required to
ask, "How clearly did we describe the law in our past decisions?". In
essence, this forces the judge's gaze on the behavior of legal
institutions themselves; the parties to the dispute, as well as the
factual and normative contest, recede in importance compared to the
state of the doctrine. Perhaps more importantly, the rule reduces
judicial behavior to the clarity of textual expression: The relevant
question is, "How clearly did we say it?", not "What are the
consequences of what we have said?". In this world, precedent is
measured by whether it equivocates rather than whether it binds.
Law becomes textual artifact rather than command.
Could this self-conscious struggle have come from nowhere,
descending without warning or design? The influences are no doubt
various. 98 But, at the same time, it seems difficult to believe that such

97 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
In damage actions, the
argument for a "clear law" standard has often been based on the notion that a
"subjective" rule (based on the official's state of mind) would allow many nonmeritorious cases to proceed through discovery and trial because, on summary
judgment, the plaintiff's complaint would raise an issue of fact based solely on the
official's state of mind. See id. at 815-16. It does not follow, however, that nonmeritorious claims must proceed simply because of the mental state alleged. For
example, a claim that an official maliciously searched the plaintiff's garbage can easily
be dismissed without regard to the official's state of mind, because there is no constitutional limitation on such searches. Only in a case where the mental state was
essential to the constitutional claim would the case proceed. Then, however, we face
the question of how the Court knows that these cases are, indeed, non meritorious ex
ante, before there has been discovery or trial.
98 In what follows, for example, I emphasize the realist critique of common law
decisionmaking, although one can also see quite easily the influence of ideas
associated with positivism and legal process. I make no claim of having found "the"
scholarly source of modern constitutional doctrine, but only that doctrinal
vocabularies reflect prevailing ideals of the judicial institution. But, even so, it is worth
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a rule could have been created in an age confident of the common
ideal of judging. No nineteenth-century court would have reached
out to embrace the idea that law was uncertain; indeed, no
nineteenth-century court would have conceived of its job in a way that
would have permitted it to embrace such a rule. The common law
model assumes that law transcends text, 99 that it is seamless and is in
this sense profoundly "unwritten. "100 In fact, the clear law rule
assumes quite the opposite-that law is made rather than found, that
it is textual rather than transcendent, that it is uncertain rather than
seamless. And, in proceeding on these assumptions, it betrays a world
in which the common law ideal ofjudging has come to be viewed with
suspicion.
The clear law rule takes a standard critique of the common law
ideal of judging and transforms that critique into doctrine itself.
Consider the charge, hailing back to Holmes and popularized by the
realist movement, that law is merely the prediction of the "behavior"
of judges. 101 There is no clearer (no pun intended) evidence of this
noting that both positivism and legal process are not unrelated to realism and, indeed,
may be seen as reactions to, or embodiments of, some tenets of realism. See Neil
Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L.
REv. 601, 623 (1993) (discussing Lon Fuller's argument that realism is simply an
example of positivism); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1996)
(noting that the legal process model was an attempt to accommodate and respond to
the realist critique). From such a perspective, it would not be surprising to see traces
of legal process or positivism in the constitutional doctrine of the post-war era.
99
See John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 117 (1929)
("The theory of the common law ... insists that in cases of first impression the court
must not be regarded as exercising an active legislative choice among a number of
possible ... rules .... On the contrary, a body of rules is supposed to be already in
existence which stands ready to decide all possible cases.").
100
See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 156 (1988)
("Text-based theories instruct a court to start with doctrinal propositions promulgated
in past texts by officials [and to] ... work backward down a chain of authorization to
determine whether the propositions are valid, and if they are, apply them to cases.
This is not how courts determine the content of the common law."); GERALD J.
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 14-29 (1986) (discussing
common law theory as law based on custom which "defined its conception of law in
sharp contrast with written or enacted law, 'lex scripta"').
101
See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFUCT
OF LAws 29 (1942) ("As practicing lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain
officials of society-judges, legislators, and others-have behaved in the past, in order
that we may make a prediction of their probable behavior in the future." (emphasis
added)); FRANK, supra note 36, at 4 7 (stating that law is "in fact prophecies or predictions ofjudicial action" and that "[i]t is from this point of view that the practice of law
has been aptly termed an act of prediction" (footnote omitted)); Underhill Moore &
Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38
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kind of behaviorism than the clear law rule. When judges apply the
rule, they do not treat prior opinions as commands but instead as
judges' "behavior"-what judges have said in the past. In effect,
judges acknowledge the power of prior precedent, but alienate
themselves from it, distancing themselves from their own authority. 102
Indeed, the clear law rule is the very embodiment of the idea that law
is a matter of prediction as applied to doctrine itself As the Supreme Court
put it in Teag;ue v. Lane, a law that fails to predict (to clearly "dictate"
an outcome) may not be governing constitutional law at all. 103
Perhaps more importantly, consider how the clear law rule has
absorbed the classic critique that courts "make" law rather than "find"
it in some transcendent universe. 104 There is no more obvious case of
courts treating their own doctrine as "made" than the clear law rule.
Clear law rules ask courts to find the "plain meaning" of their prior
precedent. Courts put themselves in the position typically reserved
for legislatures, asking statutory interpretation questions of themselves.
Remember all of the difficulties that the clear law rule posed: about
the interpretation of prior precedents, about whether the courts were
a single collective entity, and about what level of specificity could be
used to describe the claim. 105 Now compare these difficulties--of
textual ambiguity, collective meaning, and levels of generality-to our
debates about statutory interpretation. The only difference here is
that courts must ask these questions of cases and judicial history,

YALE LJ. 703, 703 (1929) ("The central problem of the lawyer is the prediction of
judicial and administrative decisions of government officers." (emphasis added)).
These can be traced back, of course, to the famous Holmesian statement that "[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
102 When applying the clear law rule, courts defer to statements of law found in
other opinions to determine the level of clarity with which a particular proposition is
stated. This leads to a kind of legal self-alienation, which Linda Meyer aptly has
described as "nothing we say matters." Meyer, supra note 92.
10' 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[A] case announces a new rule if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final.").
104 See FRANK, supra note 36, at 128 ("[W]henever a judge decides a case he is
making law." (emphasis omitted)); id. at 36-37 (explaining that the denial of "judicial
law-making" is judicial "self-deception"); id. at 121 ("The power [of judges] to
individualize and to legislate judicially is of the very essence of their function.");
LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 66 ("[T]he way to deal with a [legal] situation is to look
at the situation and its needs, and if no appropriate concept is available, then to make
one.").
105 See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
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rather than statutes and legislative history. 106 The clear law rules
demand not, as Judge Calabresi once put it, a common law for an
"age of statutes," 107 but rules of statutory interpretation for virtual
legislation.
My point is not that doctrine has in fact adopted common law
critiques or become more realistic. 108 It is that the clear law rule is not
only a rule, it is a job description. When courts create a doctrine that
requires them to find the "plain meaning" of their prior texts, they
describe themselves in ways that betray a particular self-image, an
image that departs significantly from the common law ideal. Treating
opinions as what they say, rather than what they command, creating a
rule that requires courts openly to acknowledge, and find, "unclear"
rather than transparent law, and making doctrine depend upon
shifting, rather than permanent, linguistic traditions are all signs of a
court that views its job in terms that no nineteenth-century judge
could ever understand.
If the clear law rule assumes a judicial role far different from the
common law ideal, it also suggests a sensitivity to judicial criticism
that is peculiarly modern. Indeed, in a strange sense, the rule of clear
law seems almost the embodiment of Jerome Frank's injunction that
the law analyze itself, that it become "self-conscious" of its own status
in the legal world. 109 Once upon a time, the notions that law was
uncertain, nothing more than a prediction of the behavior of lawyers,
106
Clear law cases raise, for example, questions about the meaning of a prior
precedent when judges disagree. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter,
858 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering questions about the meaning of
judicial intent when there are conflicting out-of-circuit opinions). Such cases even
raise questions about whether certain kinds of '1udicial history" (for example,
unpublished opinions or post-hoc decisions) should count. See, e.g., Martin v.
Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1997) (considering post-hoc judicial
history-using a case decided in 1993 to determine clear law in 1991); McCloud v.
Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 & n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) (considering the question of whether
judicial history that amounts to "unpublished" material should be considered in
determining clear law).
107
GUIDO CALAIIRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
108
See infra text accompanying notes 111-12.
109
Of course, Frank intended that this self-analysis would lead judges to reveal
their social and political motivations. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 114-15 ("What we
may hope some day to get from our judges are detailed autobiographies ... or
opinions annotated ... with elaborate explorations of the background factors in
[their] personal experience which swayed [them] in reaching [their] conclusions.").
The clear law rule, by contrast, applies this autobiographical injunction to the law
itself, giving us doctrinal, rather than judicial, autobiography. This, in turn, yields an
odd reversal: Rather than a truly realist exposition of a judge's motivations, doctrine
that is self-conscious provides an autobiography of itself.
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and a matter of "judicial legislation," were considered trenchant
criticisms of judicial aspirations. Today, doctrines like the clear law
rule reflect some version of these criticisms.
The most important point to see here, however, is that all of this
effort to absorb criticism turns out, in the end, to preserve a space
where law stands safe from critique. Indeed, one of the most
fascinating aspects of the clear law rule is how it both reflects
institutional doubt at the same time that it cabins it. A doctrine that
truly sought to absorb the indeterminacy critique would be a blank
canvas. By contrast, a doctrine that looks for "clear law" leaves room
for the possibility of law that is truly clear and may be found. The
beauty of doctrinalizing the institutional critique is that it gives hard
edges: outside the edges the law is unclear, but, inside, it is as clear as
it can be. Using traditional technique-the creation of bounded
categories--doctrine has managed both to bow to judicial critics and,
at the same time, to sustain faith in judicial legitimacy. It has simply
incorporated this battle into the lines it asks courts to draw between
"clear" and "unclear" law.
To see that there is a price to be paid for incorporating this battle
within doctrine, however, it is important to understand how litigants
may find themselves bearing the burden of the fight. The stated aim
of many clear law rules is to give notice to government officials that
their actions are constitutionally impermissible. 110 But the doctrine
has not been applied this way; when a court looks to determine
whether the law is unclear, it does not ask whether the law would be
unclear to a layman. Instead, it applies standards of certainty that
only a lawyer, indeed, only a judge, could know or apply. When the
constitutional tort suit against the building manager is dismissed
because the law is unclear, the standard is not the unclarity to the
building manager, but the unclarity to judges. 111 What average
One of the principal arguments for such rules is that they refuse to apply
impossible standards of legal acumen to ordinary government officials. See Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1791 (noting the unfairness of imposing liability on government officials who have "reasonably relied on authoritative pronouncements of constitutional law"); Meyer, supra note 64, at 1503 (arguing that the focus in qualified
immunity cases is "fair notice to governmental officials"). The irony, of course, is that,
as applied, the rules measure uncertainty by the uncertainty of lawyers, not laymen.
111 Lest this appear an unlikely example, I litigated just such a case in the Fifth
Circuit on behalf of the Justice Department, representing a low-level federal building
manager who was sued for violating the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (The
plaintiff sought to pass out a mock FBI "Wanted" poster of Ronald Reagan that the
manager believed deceptively resembled a real FBI poster.) The case was insubstantial
because the plaintiff suffered no damage; the leaflets were distributed. Litigating the
110
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government employee do you know who understands that he may
ignore a district court in the city next door because, after all, it is in a
different circuit? 112 Or that he could be bound by an opinion that was
officially "unpublished" or decided after the events in question? Even
in habeas cases, where the government officials involved are state
judges, the inquiry is not about the "lived" uncertainty of the judges
who decided the original appeal, but an abstract, ungrounded
question of whether precedent would have "dictated" a different
outcome.m
In a sense, the rule of clear law measures the justice of real-life
claims by law's own sense of uncertainty. Herein lies the danger of a
modernist, inward-looking rhetoric. It is not that the people are "left
out" of the Court's opinions or that the resulting style is too
formulaic. It is that an institution that asks doctrine to answer
difficult questions about law and legal clarity may indulge its own
institutional insecurities at the expense of the litigants. In classical
architecture, the Ionic column that is perfectly rendered may inspire
our contemplation and admiration, but, if it cannot bear weight, it
will leave a building in collapse. So, too, a rule which focuses on
courts' own institutional self-image may leave litigants with little to
stand upon. There are real institutional choices to be made in these
cases, but the rule of clear law does not help us make those choices. 114
The doctrine keeps us focused on the "clarity" of the court's own
texts. And, in so doing, it asks litigants to bear the costs of the court's
own self-consciousness-costs that must be measured not only in the

clear law issues, however, raised some difficult questions about the "clarity" of the law
and how specifically one should describe the "right" at issue (was it the right to free
speech, the right to pass out leaflets in a public building, or, as the manager claimed,
the right to pass out leaflets that were misleadingly like FBI Wanted Posters?). Perhaps
this explains why the appellate court simply reversed without opinion. See Foster v.
Bowen, 866 F.2d 1419 (1989).
112 Although some courts seem to have recognized this difficulty, they have resisted
its implications for all cases. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858
F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1988) (expressing doubt that out-of-circuit decisions can
make law "clear," without acknowledging that the defendants were as unlikely to be
aware of decisions within the circuit as without).
m See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990) ("We have held, however,
that a new decision generally is not applicable in cases on collateral review unless the
decision was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction
became final.").
114
Indeed, it tends to obscure the choices by focusing on the court's image
without considering the court's role vis-a-vis other institutions. See KOMESAR, supra
note 21, at 6, 134-50 (describing how comparative institutional analysis would ask
these questions).
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time spent in answering questions about "what law counts" and "how
clear is clear," but also in a legal system that purports to measure the
justice of a claim against a government building manager by legal
intricacies only judges and lawyers could know.

Ill.

INTERESTS AND EXPECTATIONS

If the clear law rule seems outside the core of standard
constitutional law concepts, let me expand the scope of the inquiry to
more familiar territory. One cannot be a native speaker of modern
constitutional law without being well-versed in a rather complex
rhetoric of expectation and interest. 115 Indeed, the architecture of
much standard constitutional law depends upon the notion that there
are constitutional "interests" that can be identified and classified in
various ways (as fundamental or compelling, as social or economic, or
in other ways), and that these classifications tell us which
"perspective" to take on the claim (whether to strictly scrutinize or
defer) .116 The "rule of perspective" is my shorthand for a tendency to
craft legal doctrine in a way that does not purport to direct conduct
per se, but instead points the judging party to a certain imaginative
position vis-a-vis the case, toward or against one party, for or against a
particular argument.
Interests and expectations are as ubiquitous in modern
constitutional law as are the rules of perspective that enforce them. 117
Indeed, rules of perspective have become a popular way of creating
new constitutional doctrine. Thus, in criminal procedure, when
asked to decide how to determine what qualifies as a "search," or

115
Case books indoctrinate students quite openly in the language of metaconstitutional law. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 561 (1996)
("One therefore cannot understand the equal protection clause without first understanding the general methodology courts use to resolve equal protection disputes ....
In recent years, the Court's approach has involved creation of various 'tiers' of
review.... [C]Iassifications not drawn on a 'suspect basis' are subject to 'low-level' or
'rational basis' review .... ").
116 See id. at 842; jOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3, at 600-06 (5th ed. 1995).
117 These concepts extend far beyond the area of individual rights with which they
are typically associated. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 670-71 ( 1981) (requiring in a dormant commerce clause case a perspective that is
"sensitive" to "the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the
extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce").
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whether a person is "in custody" for purposes of applying Miranda, 118
or the proper standard for a Terry stop, 119 the Court reaches out to a
rule of perspective; the Court tells the applier of the law that the
search, custody, or stop depends upon the interests and perspective
. h .
.
120
o f a reasonabl e person m t e situation.
Of course, rules of perspective can be traced to concepts as old as
the republic, as can the concept of "interest" in constitutional law. 121
Still, it is difficult to believe that we could simply replace the modern
rhetoric of interest and perspective with the rhetoric of another time
or place. Once upon a time, courts spoke of litigants' claims and
arguments, not their interests or expectations, and they applied a rule
of constitutional arbitrariness rather than a complex metataxonomy
of constitutional scrutinies. 122 Lest we doubt the change, all we need
to do is consider how older common law concepts such as "the police
power" or "vested rights" might have looked had they emerged in an
age of "interest and expectation." The police power might have been
"a compelling police interest." "Vested rights" might have been those
rights in which the complainant had an "expectation of security." To
enunciate these rules is to embrace anachronism; it is to impose the
ring of modern doctrine upon an older, largely forgotten, discourse.
It is possible, of course, that nothing much hangs on how these
rules are expressed-that it does not matter whether we use the term
"interest" or "expectation" or whether the rule is framed in terms of a
perspective. On the other hand, there are reasons to question why
the shift seems so natural today. Many constitutional rules might
have been stated in different ways. Rather than saying, for example,
that privacy or security depended upon the "expectation" of the
parties, the Court might simply have enumerated impermissible

118
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 442 (1984) ("[T]he only relevant inquiry [in custody cases] is how a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.").
119
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436
(1991) (defining "free to leave" as "whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter").
120
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,]., concurring)
(defining a search for Fourth Amendment purposes in terms of a reasonable person's
expectation of privacy).
121
The Federalist Papers, for example, cannot be understood without a healthy
appreciation of the meaning of the term "interest." See Victoria Nourse, Toward a ''Due
Foundation" for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74
TEX. L. REv. 447,478-81 (1996).
122 See infra note 138.

1428

UNIVERSrrY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REWEW

[Vol. 145: 1401

government intrusions. 123
Similarly, rather than developing a
hierarchy of scrutinies, the Court might have stated that some
reasons, such as race, are almost never a reason to disadvantage
persons. That these rules might have been stated this way, however,
does not explain why courts have clung to a different rhetoric.
A. Perspective, Considered

A foreign observer looking for help understanding the role of
interest, expectation, and perspective in one of its more
straightforward appearances might do well to start with Katz v. United
States! 24 the quintessential modern criminal procedure decision. In
Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred
warrantless government wiretaps to overhear conversations in a public
telephone booth. 125 In so holding, the Court refused to limit the
Fourth Amendment's protection to governmental trespass! 26 instead
concluding that a search depended upon an individual's "right to
privacy." 127
The doctrinal rule, taken from Justice Harlan's
concurrence, was that a search was to be judged by the defendant's
"expectation of privacy. "128
Although it is difficult to see today, the Court need not have
created a rule of perspective to decide Katz. Existing doctrine could
not yield the result the Court chose: Rules of trespass left Mr. Katz's
case uncovered, and deciding that a public telephone booth was a
"constitutionally protected area" 129 seemed constitutional hyperbole.
On the other hand, there were alternatives. For example, the Court
125 See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing different ways in
which the Fourth Amendment search rule might have been formulated).
1" 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
125 See id. at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth .... ").
126 See id. ("We conclude that ... the 'trespass' doctrine ... can no longer be
regarded as controlling.").
127 See id. at 350-51 (contrasting the individual's right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment with a person's more general right to privacy governed by the states); see
also id. at 353 ("The Government's activities ... violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied .... ").
128 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule ... is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'").
129 See id. at 349-50 (noting that petitioner's questions were directed to whether a
phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area").
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might have ruled that the government must justify its use of
technology to obtain information that the human senses cannot. 130
Or, the Court might have expressed its ruling in terms of propertythat the government may not, without justification or consent,
appropriate conversations of private citizens for public use. 151 Or it
might have expressed the rule in terms of due process-that the
government may not, without justification, profit from taking action
which, if taken by private parties, would amount to a violation of
I aw.
Each of these approaches differs rather distinctly from the rule
adopted in Katz precisely because that rule is one of perspective.
Rather than asserting substantive authority, such rules assert
methodological authority: Courts are asked to decide by placing
themselves in a particular position vis-a-vis the parties and their
claims. Just as a rational basis rule tells judges to take a particular
intellectual stance with respect to the government's justification, the
Katz rule tells judges to take a particular intellectual stance with
respect to defendants' expectations. This imaginative exercise, by
which the court is asked to identify or distance itself from the litigants
or their claims, is then tempered by a rule against self-interest: The
defendant's perspective or the state's interest will be honored only if
found "reasonable" or "legitimate."
The great and well-known difficulty of Katz's rule is its tendency to
dissolve into circularity. Shortly after Katz was decided, Professor
Anthony Amsterdam demonstrated this quite easily. He simply asked
us to consider the possibility that "the government could diminish
each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half-hourly on television that ... we were all forthwith being placed
under comprehensive electronic surveillance." 133 Once everyone
expects to be spied upon, individuals not only lose their "subjective"
expectation of privacy, but risk the loss of their objective expectation
1~2

130
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the
government must justify its use of tracking beepers when these electronic devices allow
agents to monitor persons or property withdrawn from public view).
131
See WHITE, supra note 37, at 143 (suggesting possible property-type arguments
in the wiretapping context).
132
This argument is derived from the famous principle enunciated by Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead that "[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissenting).
'" Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974).
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as well: If everyone anticipates government surveillance, a contrary
expectation may well seem unreasonable.
As Amsterdam's
hypothetical illustrates, if we change the world in ways that seem
grossly unfair or dangerous, rules of perspective risk deference to that
unfairness or dangerousness. 134 And they do so precisely because they
purport to be rules of perspective-because they ask courts to reach a
legal conclusion based on what are assumed to be the preexisting
interests and expectations of the parties.
The most fascinating aspect of this story is not how it ended, but
that it has been repeated so often, despite persistent doubts that this
doctrinal method can really deliver the "realism" or the '1ustice" that
it promises. The "search" cases, for example, end up being decided
based on whether the court declares the parties' expectations to be
"reasonable," yielding results that often depart from what people say
are their "real" expectations of privacy. 135 A similar phenomenon can
be seen in other areas of constitutional law. Indeed, it is now
conventional wisdom that the most important question in many
constitutional cases is how the court should characterize a perspective
or interest or right (as compelling or legitimate or fundamental), 136 a
process that may or may not yield results consistent with public
expectation. Not surprisingly, there is no ready correlation between
rules of perspective and sound constitutional results. Korematsu's
twentieth-century reference to the "most rigid scrutiny" 137 has not
saved it from constitutional disgrace any more than Yick Wo's reliance

'" See Nourse, supra note 19, at 1374-80 (discussing an analogous process in the
context of criminal law).
"' Christopher Slobogin &Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings &cognized
and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE LJ. 727, 737-42 (1993) (reporting results of an

empirical study showing that the "expectations" rule in the Fourth Amendment
context has yielded results distinctly different from people's "actual" expectations of
privacy).
136 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that the choice of a level of scrutiny often determines the
outcome of a particular case); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,Levels of Generality
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1057, 1065 (1990) (noting that
"whether to designate a right as fundamental poses a central substantive question in
modern constitutional law," a question that often depends upon "competing characterizations of the level of generality" at which to describe the right in question).
m Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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on the ancient constitutional language of "arbitrariness" has hindered
. .
I
. 138
consutuuona pra1se.

B. justice as Culture
Given the difficulties, why have courts chosen to embrace
constitutional perspectivism in such a vast array of forms and cases? If
we imagine that doctrinal formulations reflect courts' image of
themselves, the origins of these rules may become clearer. Think
about it for a minute: redescribing the "police power" as a "police
interest" jars the native speaker of constitutional law, not only because
of linguistic habit, but also because it brings together two very
different ideas of law and courts. A police "interest" suggests that the
court's job is to describe and defer to what exists "out there" in the
real world; a police "power" suggests quite a different judicial rolethat the court does not defer to, but commands, legal relationships,
and that it does so without regard to real world analogues. Subtly
perhaps, but nevertheless clearly, the rhetoric portrays an
institutional image-one which pits a common law ideal of courts
against a seemingly more "realistic" ideal, one in which courts aspire
to arbitrate social interests rather than to master the established
doctrinal order.
This shifting ideal came, of course, from somewhere, and rules of
perspective betray those influences. 139 It hardly seems a coincidence,
for example, that judges of the post-war period would embrace
doctrinal terms reflecting social "interests." Would it have been
possible to graduate from law school in the 1940s and 1950s, as the
judges of the 1970s and 1980s did, without learning that the Supreme
Court had precipitated a constitutional crisis when it preferred
concepts of property and contract to "social interest" and "situation-

1"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 367 (1886) (recounting the common
nineteenth-century understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the
"arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty," and that the ordinance in question granted
authority to the government that was "purely arbitrary''); see GILLMAN, supra note 56, at
72 (arguing that the Court in Yick Wo concluded that the ordinances at issue were
arbitrary because they were "based simply on favoritism or spite, and not on any 'good
reason"' related to the general welfare).
139
The image of judging as arbitration can be traced to the realist critique of the
common law ideal. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 36, at 157 ("The judge, at his best, is an
arbitrator . ... [T] he arbitral function is the central fact in the administration of
justice.").
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sense"? 140 Indeed, Dean Pound's sociological jurisprudence insisted
that a vocabulary of social interests should replace common law
concepts. 141 And, although the legal realists rejected Pound/ 42 they,
too, decried the old, failed formalism because it did not reflect "the
realities of ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions." 14s
With this history in mind, it is easier to see how rules of
perspective reflect modern indictments of the common law ideal.
What better way to make the law reflect social interests than to create
doctrinal rules that depend quite openly on those interests? If the
common law model focuses too heavily on the "ought" rather than
the "is,"144 what better way to correct that error than by acknowledging
that law is a matter of "perspective"? 145 If the common law model
failed to recognize that facts were more reliable than values, 146 then

Llewellyn specifically recommended that the "forecasting" and "prediction" of
the "ordinary lawyer" was better achieved when "situation-sense" helped to
"reshap[e] ... the doctrinal materials used." LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at I99.
Llewellyn meant many things by "situation-sense," of course, variously defining it in his
later years as "the facts of the situation taken as a type," id. at I22, and a "fact-pattern"
that "carrie[d] within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law." /d. (quoting
Levin Goldschmidt).
141
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines,
27 HARV. L. REV. I95, 225-34 (19I4) (noting that "a movement is taking place palpably
in the law of all countries today," emphasizing "social interest"); Roscoe Pound, A
Suroey of Sociallnterests, 57 HARV. L. REV. I, I3 (I943) (originally published as A Theury
of Social Interests, I5 PAPERS & PROC. AM. Soc. SoC'Y I6 (192I)) ("In general, but not
always, it is expedient to put claims or demands in their most generalized form, i.e., as
social interests, in order to compare them.").
142
Llewellyn's famous article on realism seems both to praise Pound's "balancing
of interests," and, at the same time, to ask "how" one "tell[s] an interest when you see
one." Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 435 & n.3.
145
FRANK, supra note 36, at 7; see Cohen, supra note 73, at 8I2 (criticizing opinionwriting "apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by
which the law is to be judged"); Horwitz, supra note I, at 209 ("[The r] ealists agreed
that law needed to be brought back in touch with life, that legal categories needed to
reflect better or express a more complex social reality.").
144
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 212 (noting the charge, made by Fuller, that the
realists sought to make the "Ought acquiesce in the Is").
145
Normative "relativism" is a feature of some realist writing. See AMERICAN LEGAL
REAuSM, supra note 6, at 169 ("One aspect of the Realists' outlook ... was their
ambivalence concerning the origins and status of moral propositions. A few members ... forthrightly adopted the stance of ethical relativism .... ").
146
Early realist critiques were strongly influenced by the idea that facts and
experience are more reliable than rules or values. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REAusM,
supra note 6, at 166 (noting that many realists insisted "that, to be meaningful and
useful, [legal] generalizations must be empirically based (derived from verifiable data)
and narrow (incorporating only a small collection of manifestly similar situations or
propositions).").
140
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what better way to cure this blindness than to focus courts on the job
of describing real-life interests and expectations?
A court that reaches out to embrace a doctrinal rule based on
social expectations and interests announces not only a job
description, but also a preferred legal method. A common law model
proceeds by emphasis on backward-looking analogical reasoning. 147
By contrast, a rule of perspective is decidedly forward-looking: It tells
the reader how to attend to the decisionmaking process, to
imaginatively identify with one of the parties or the arguments at
issue. Didactic rather than authoritative, rules of perspective try to
teach us how to intellectually attack the problem rather than to
prescribe solutions. Summoning such directions appears to point the
way to predict, enhancing the court's sense of its candor about
decisionmaking. 148 Soon, the facts and holdings so important to the
common law method recede in importance relative to questions
about the proper level of scrutiny, the nature of the interest, or the
character of the expectation. 149 Backward-looking analogy is placed in
the service of the new emphasis on methodology. 15{)
This account of critique being absorbed by doctrine tells only half
the story, however. As we have seen before, incorporating such
critiques within doctrine has a way of sustaining older ideals. The
other half of this story, then, is how rules of interest and expectation
end up cabining the critique. If law were only culture or perspective,
of course, we would need no law at all. But bending perspective to
doctrinal rule puts hard edges around the critique, leaving substantial
room for the old-fashioned exercise of judicial authority and
command. Just as the rule of unclear law leaves room for clear law,
rules of interest and expectation leave room for something more than

147
The common law focus on analogical reasoning was a favorite target of realist
attack. See HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 205 (noting that realism had "drawn into
question" the "process of analogy itself ... as fundamentally political," and that, for
many realists, analogy was, in effect, "judicial legislation").
~<a This kind of candor was prized by realist critics of the common law model. See
FRANK, supra note 36, at 12! ("To do their intricate job well our judges need all the
clear consciousness of their purpose which they can summon to their aid.").
149
Witness the Court's lengthy discussions of the proper "level of scrutiny." See,
e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing, in an equal protection case,
the three levels of scrutiny and noting how the application turns on the classifications
made).
150
I do not mean to suggest by this that courts have given up analogical reasoning;
they have not. Instead, analogical reasoning has been redirected from facts and
statute toward methodology. See infra Part IV (discussing the creation of categories
unified by methodology).
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culture and perspective. The expectation is not the end of the case,
the reasonable expectation is; scrutiny is not the finish, the level of
scrutiny is. Courts still exercise normative authority, but simply do it
in different rhetorical guises. They decide which expectations are
reasonable or which interests are compelling or merely important.
Embracing perspective as doctrine, then, means that there are some
cases in which perspective does not count, where values are not
relative, where courts may make "objective" judgments about
reasonable expectations of privacy and compelling governmental
interests.
One might argue that all of this effort serves important purposes.
Professor Schauer, for example, has argued that courts should selfconsciously emulate the making oflegislative rules. 151 Unlike others, I
have no quarrel with courts borrowing concepts or formats that seem
closer to the legislative rulemaking ideal. Form is not the issue: a
three-part test may be the agent of terror as easily as a one-word
command. The danger here is not in courts' recognition or
emulation of legislative style, but that the courts' struggle for their
own identities is a rhetorical diversion-that the rhetoric of selfconsciousness will eclipse, and subvert, the real decisions that need to
be made.
First, there is the danger that the rhetorical compromise between
a law that defers and one that judges will be mistaken for one that has
simply given up judging. Describing a "claim" as an "interest"
grounds it in nature.
Unlike a "claim," which is pure legal
convention, an "interest" appears to exist in the world without regard
to what the court does and will exist long after the court has come to
its decision. This "naturalizing" of legal arguments in the world
encourages deference to popular needs but risks indifference to the
unpopular. A rule that encourages courts to believe that all they are
doing is "describing" a world of interests and perspectives, if imposed
on a world full of inequalities, will simply redescribe, and entrench,
those inequalities within the law itself. 152 As R.M. Hare put it,
"standards only remain current when those who make judgements in
accordance with them are quite sure that, whatever else they may be

151 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1470 (arguing that "it may be appropriate to think of
opinion writing as (at least in part) a conscious process of rule making").
152 Even those sympathetic to the realist project have acknowledged this.
See
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 211 (noting Fuller's criticism that "in attempting to have law
simply mirror society, Realism ended up endowing the Is with normative content").
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doing, they are evaluating (i.e. really seeking to guide conduct)." 153
Nothing in the rule of perspective's future-focused gaze or its threeprong attack tells us when law should "reflect" life and when "life's
inequalities" require some kind of corrective push. Indeed, it may
make this choice difficult to see by wrapping all the normative
decisions into the adjectives we use to describe the interests claimed.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, there is the lurking
question whether all this rhetorical work will help the court decide.
When courts engage in "interest-speak," they are trying to maintain
an image of themselves as "realistic," but, at the same time,
normatively authoritative. As Philip Bobbitt put it, "[d]octrinal
argument as we know it today seeks to preserve the aesthetic of the
rule of law in the new context created by realism." 154 The balance
between realist critique and common law image is worked out in
concepts that flip-flop between life and law, between the descriptive
and the prescriptive, between interests and compelling interests. Will
a search for the intensifYing attributes of the interests claimed (what
is compelling, what is clear, what is reasonable) tell us much about
the individual or institutional consequences of the decision?
Ultimately, there will be a result to these cases: the court will decide
one way or another; it will either remake the decisions of legislatures
or defer to political decisionmakers; it will honor the claims of social
reality or brand societal ideals as prejudice. The risk here is that the
rhetoric used to make these decisions does less to resolve those
questions than it does to serve the institution (and to sustain its selfimage in a realist world). The risk is that, in making decisions, courts
will ask questions, not about those who will have to live by their
decision, but that they will ask and answer questions about its own
identity.

IV. READING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
We move, finally, to the way in which constitutional cases are
"read" in the modern era. The story is familiar enough: one day a
judge has occasion to use an expression that involves an adjective of
weight, power, strength, or direction (for example, "compelling,"
"hard," or "fundamental"). Upon reading this opinion, later courts
seize upon the adjective and conclude that the earlier case stands for
a principle that the adjective announces. Over time and repeated
"' R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 147 (corrected ed. 1972).
154 BOBBIIT, supra note 61, at 42.
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use, the chosen phrase is elevated to constitutional stardom. What is
important for our purposes here is not the particular part of speech
chosen, but the habit of mind and the unstated theoretical
commitments that this reading entails. When lawyers transform the
ofThand use of an intensifying adjective (for example, "fundamental")
into a category of legal significance (for example, "fundamental
rights"), they perform an act of enormous legal importance that may
escape careful consideration or reflection. As I hope to show, this
very reading of cases reflects a response to popular critiques of more
traditional common law ideals of decisionmaking.
A. Making Categories

Let us take a closer look at the typical course of one-perhaps
archetypal--example of this process. During the 1960s and early
1970s, the Supreme Court announced what doctrinalists have come to
call the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection doctrine.
Although the cases often dealt with very different subject matters, the
word "fundamental" was quickly seized upon in law reviews and lower
courts. The doctrine, as repeated, provided that litigants invoking
"fundamental rights" were entitled to special protection; the
government's interest, in such cases, would be strictly scrutinized. 155
Some of the most difficult equal protection cases before the Court
.
th ese years--cases on race, 156 votmg,
•
157
. 158 an d
d unng
reprod uct10n,
criminal procedure 159-relied, at least in part, on the idea of
"fundamental rights." 160 It was not long, however, before scholars and
doctrinalists both wondered how far the category could be stretched.

155 See STONE ET AL., sufrra note 115, at 842 (examining the intersection of equal
protection and implied fundamental rights jurisprudence).
156 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(striking down an antimiscegenation statute).
157 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (upholding one person-one
vote).
153 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(striking down statute
prohibiting provision of contraceptives).
159 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (striking down denial of
right of indigent defendants to counsel on appeal).
160 There were, of course, the equally controversial"fundamental rights" cases that
did not explicitly invoke the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
On the differences between the "equal protection" and "due process" strands of
fundamental rights jurisprudence, see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 ( 1979).
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The Court ultimately called a halt161 but, in the course of the
retrenchment, many came to question the original project-the
doctrinal embrace of the word "fundamental." 162 If treatises, case
books, and scholarly articles are any measure, however, the
fundamental rights strand of equal protection doctrine stuck, and
stuck despite its tendency to unleash violent attacks on the Court's
embrace of so-called unenumerated rights. 163
How did we arrive here? If a traveler from a foreign legal culture
turned to traditional legal materials governing the Equal Protection
Clause, she would almost immediately be directed by the literature to
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 164 Casebooks and treatises tell us that Skinner
stands at the base of a pyramid of ascendingly complex "fundamental
rights" cases. 165 In Skinner, we learn, "[t]he Court first pointed to
fundamental interests in the equal protection context." 166 Similarly,
treatises tell us that Skinner marked "the first time constitutional
recognition of a fundamental right was held by the Supreme Court to
. "but10n.
.
,167
man d ate a norm o f equaI d 1stn
When our visiting scholar turns to the Skinner opinion itself,
however, she is likely to be quite disappointed. Scanning the opening
161 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing
to find "education" a fundamental right necessitating strict scrutiny of differential
school funding schemes).
162 As justice Harlan famously put it in Shapiro v. Thompson: "I must reiterate that I
know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection under an
unusually stringent equal protection test." 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
163
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAw63-64 (1990) ("Skinnerrevived and remade the equal protection clause" in
ways that "cannot avoid legislating" by permitting courts to decide which classifications
should be treated like race).
164
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that a state statute providing for the sterilization
of habitual criminals violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
165
See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 115, at 842; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
116, § 14.27, at 797 ("The development of the contemporary concept of a
constitutionally protected 'right of privacy' in sexual matters can be traced to the
Supreme Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma. ... This rationale ... established the
basis for 'fundamental rights' analysis under the due process and equal protection
guarantees ... .").
166
STONE ET AL., supra note 115, at 842. Thus, Supreme Court opinions discussing
Skinner say things like: Skinner is among the cases that stand for the proposition that
"[c]lassifications that burden, impinge or discriminate against such fundamental
interests are 'highly suspect.'" Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas,].,
dissenting in part).
167
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (2d ed. 1988).
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of the opinion, she would find no reference to the term
"fundamental," nor to the announced shift in doctrine predicted by
the treatises. She would note that the opinion opens by emphasizing
that the case "touches a sensitive and important area of human
rights," involving the "right to have offspring," 168 but would find no
immediate reinforcement that the Court was forging a new rule,
rather than merely making an introductory bow toward reversal. For,
almost immediately after this announcement, the opinion launches
into territory that seems ill-suited to express a clear break with the
past. Instead, our foreign observer would read Justice Douglas's
protestations that he was not departing from existing case law, 169 and
would note his insistence that he was giving the state the same "large
deference" accorded to the Court's post-New Deal equal protection
cases. 170 And as she read on, she would become convinced that
Skinner is primarily occupied with distinctions that play no part in its
popular history. Justice Douglas devoted most of the opinion to the
claim that the statute applied to petty thieves but not to white-collar
criminals. A three-time thief, Douglas wrote, may be sterilized, but an
embezzler may not, a distinction repeated throughout the opinion in
. . d eta1'1171
excruCiatmg
.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
See id. at 540-41. In a portion of the opinion typically excised from case books,
Justice Douglas emphasized the Court's duty of deference toward states' choices,
writing:
[The states] may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems
according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience .... [A]
State is not constrained in the exercise of its police power to ignore experience which marks a class of offenders or a family of offenses for special treatment. Nor is it prevented by the equal protection clause from confining "its
restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest."
!d. at540 (quotingMillerv. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373,384 (1915)).
170
See id. at 541 ("[W]e give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the
foregoing cases requires.").
171
Id. at 538-39 ("[H]e who embezzles property worth more than $20 is guilty of a
felony. A clerk who appropriates over $20 from his employer's till and a stranger who
steals the same amount are thus both guilty of felonies. If the latter repeats his act and
is convicted three times, he may be sterilized. But the clerk is not subject to the pains
and penalties of the Act no matter how large his embezzlements nor how frequent his
convictions. A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a
felony; and he may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of
the property and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an embezzler. Hence, no matter
how habitual his proclivities for embezzlement are and no matter how often his
conviction, he may not be sterilized." (citations omitted)). This "class" distinction is a
repeated theme ofjustice Douglas's opinion:
In terms of fines and imprisonment, the crimes oflarceny and embezzlement
rate the same under the Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to sterilization
168
169
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Only if the foreign scholar continues past the lengthy discussions
about petty thieves and embezzlers, past the earlier cases and the
deference to be accorded to the state, will she find the reference to
"fundamental" that modern writers emphasize. Six pages into the
opinion, almost at its end, she finds these words: "We are dealing
here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race." 172 Here, the foreign scholar finds
the doctrine of the opinion. 173 Not surprisingly, she may be moved to
ask why we have invested this particular passage with more
importance than the rule of deference, the arbitrary criminal law
distinctions, or the biologically irreparable penalty. Indeed, she may
wonder why the treatises have enthroned this passage as doctrine by
means of the term "fundamental rights" when the passage itself
speaks offundamentality "[to] the race." 174
If pressed, we would have to admit that Skinner might be read a
number of other ways and that it might have been doctrinalized
differently. We might have said that Skinner is about class distinctions
in criminal law; 175 we might have said that Skinner is about the
imposition of irreparable biological harm. 176 Indeed, I believe there is
are the pains and penalties of the law different. The equal protection clause
would indeed be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial
lines could be drawn.
/d. at 542. "Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with
immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination." /d. at 541. "Here there is no such saving feature. Embezzlers are
forever free. Those who steal or take in other ways are not. If such a classification
were permitted, the technical common law concept of a 'trespass' ... could readily
become a rule of human genetics." /d. at 542.
172 /d. at 541.
"' See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.27, at 797 ("Despite the broad
police powers of the state, this classification violated the equal protection clause
because it could not withstand the scrutiny to which the fundamental nature of the
right involved demanded it be subjected.").
174
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
175
Indeed, Skinner has been read with sympathy toward this position. See TRIBE,
supra note 167, at 1464-65 (noting that the Court in Skinner was not only concerned
with the "right to reproduce," but also evidenced "an even greater preoccupation with
the notion that the state's classifications had been promulgated with their harshest
effect against a relatively powerless minority, that of lower-class, as opposed to whitecollar, criminals," a distinction that Tribe likens to "invidious or suspect classification").
176
See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson,]., concurring) ("There are limits to
the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minorityeven those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes.").
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good reason to suspect that Justice Douglas may have feared that race
was a lurking issue. He may have known that the statutory term
triggering sterilization, crimes of "moral turpitude," had been used to
cloak efforts to control, demean, and disenfranchise MricanAmericans.177 But, even if he did not, by 1942 Hitler had shown quite
clearly how the eugenics movement, which inspired the Skinner
statute, could be bent toward racist and, indeed, genocidal ends. 178 In
Skinner, Justice Douglas simply warned us of the racial implications of
Oklahoma's statute in ways that seem oblique today, by noting the

177 Several years earlier, in 1935, the Supreme Court noted the ways in which race
was connected to the concept of "moral turpitude" in both the popular and legal
imagination. In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), the Court struck down
Alabama's practice of excluding blacks from juries under a statute that, among other
things, barred jury service by those who had committed a "crime involving moral
turpitude." In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the jury commissioner's
testimony that he did "not know of any negro in Morgan County over twenty-one and
under sixty-five who ... has neuer been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude." /d. at
598-99 (emphasis added). Decades later, the Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), holding that Alabama had
cloaked blatant efforts to establish "white supremacy" by disenfranchising blacks in a
constitutional provision that barred voting by persons who had committed a "crime
involving moral turpitude." /d. at 228-32; see also Claudia Johnson, Without Tradition
and Within Reason: judge Horton and Atticus Finch in Court, 45 ALA. L. REv. 483, 492-94
(1994) (discussing the connection between crimes of moral turpitude and exclusions
of black jurors and testimony by black witnesses). If, indeed, the statutory triggering
factor, "crimes of moral turpitude," was known as a potential refuge for racism, then
Douglas was correct when he made his famously difficult statement that the statute's
classification was as potentially "invidious" as the "select[ion of] a particular race."
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. It would also explain why Justice Douglas seemed to rely so
heavily on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a case involving racial
discrimination.
178
The statute at issue in Skinner was passed during the heyday of the eugenics
movement, a movement that spawned such overtly racist statutes as the one barring
interracial marriages, struck down decades later in Loving v. ViJginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). In America, the movement inspired dozens of state statutes aimed at
protecting the public health. See Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme
Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 1, 1 (1996) ("The most powerful vehicle of the eugenic ideology was the law.").
It was in this atmosphere that the Court, in Buck v. Bell, upheld the sterilization of, as
Justice Holmes put it, "imbeciles." 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). By the time Skinner was
decided in 1942, the Nazi eugenics program had been in operation for almost a
decade, and had called into question the American movement's premises and racist
potential. See Lombardo, supra, at 11-12. Critics of the American movement charged
that it branded minorities as genetically undesirable, "socially inadequate and a
constant menace to the white race and society at large." Barbara L. Bernier, Class,
Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political Choices, 11 HARV. BLACKl..ETfER
J. 115, 130 (1994) (citing ELAINE ELLIS, STERILIZATION: A MENACE TO THE NEGRO 155
(1937)).
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power of the remedy, "[i]n evil or reckless hands," 179 to "cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
,180
.
d1sappear.
Skinner has come to mean, in many ways, what later cases-cases
on abortion and contraception-have required it to mean. 181 The
point here is not whether those later cases have interpreted Skinner
correctly. 182 The point is that standard doctrinal treatments have

179 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. This is, most likely, a reference to Hitler. Shortly after
the Skinner opinion was issued, Jewish organizations turned to Douglas to help publicize the plight of European Jews. Douglas declined until an impassioned telegram
from the American Jewish Congress in February of 1943 implored him-in the name
of the "two million Jews [that had] already been murdered by Hitler"-to offer his
words at a Madison Square Garden rally. Telegram from Stephen S. Wise, American
Jewish Congress, to William Douglas 2 (Feb. 25, 1943) (on file with Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress). Douglas wrote a draft of a speech that opened
dramatically: "Barbarism has no restraints. A decade ago the Nazis commenced their
systematic torture of the Jews. This savagery was now spread over the continent of
Europe." William 0. Douglas, Radio Address from Madison Square Garden (Mar. 1,
1943) (draft on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
Douglas was also aware of the light the Nazi practices shed on American racism.
One of the first letters to congratulate Douglas on his Madison Square Garden speech
was from the NAACP, noting that the organization particularly appreciated Douglas's
"inclusion of the reference to discrimination based on color" (a reference that does
not appear in the printed speech). Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to
William 0. Douglas (Mar. 5, 1943) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
180
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). The connection to race, eugenics,
and history might have been clearer had Justice Douglas included a sentence he
excised from his original draft: "The classification hardly has firmer constitutional
basis than if in dealing with particular offenses it drew a line between rich and poor or
between Nordic and other racial types." See William 0. Douglas, Draft of Opinion in Skinner
(n.d.) (unpublished draft, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)
(emphasis added). Douglas substituted for this sentence a more oblique reference to
the use of a rule of trespass to create "a rule of human genetics." Skinner, 316 U.S. at
542.
181
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Skinner with other
"fundamental rights" decisions).
182
There are many wise and important reasons for this modern reading, not the
least of which is that it allows us to forget that, applied literally, Justice Douglas's
opinion would actually constitutionalize sterilization procedures as long as they were
applied evenly, across the board. As Chief Justice Stone put it in his concurring
opinion: "If Oklahoma may resort generally to the sterilization of criminals . . . I
seriously doubt that the equal protection clause requires it to apply the measure to all
criminals in the first instance, or to none." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543 (Stone, CJ.,
concurring). By emphasizing the fundamental rights aspect of the case, and deemphasizing the equal protection aspect of the opinion, we harmonize the opinion in
favor of our modern sensibilities that find sterilization offensive. See, e.g., Katharine T.
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 WIS. L.
REv. 303, 310 & n.28 ( 1995) (articulating the widely held view that Skinner is really an
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chosen to "read" the case in a particular way, remembering certain
aspects and forgetting others-remembering the case for its adjectival
enthusiasms rather than for its subject (criminal law), or its statute
(crimes of "moral turpitude"), or the history of racist eugenics. 183
This rule of doctrinal recognition is far from controversial 184-it is
shared by conservatives and liberals alike; indeed, it is necessary to
their battle about the "existence" of fundamental rights. 185 For all
intents and purposes, then, as the casebooks, treatises, and law
reviews tell us, Skinner is a "fundamental rights" case. 186

B. Textual Anxieties
A foreign observer, unsteeped in contemporary controversies,
might note that this way of reading Skinner is far from given. Skinner
could be categorized as a case about sterilization, or eugenics, or
arbitrary distinctions within the criminal law. Focus might have been
cast on the distinction between stealing chickens and stealing stocks,
or on the history of the Court's shifting views on sterilization. 187
Today, we doctrinalize Skinner with a different ideal in mind:
Treatises and hornbooks find Skinners doctrine in a bit of text
reconceived as methodology. 188 Not surprisingly, what most people
remember about Skinner is neither its era nor its statute, but its fit
within analytic structures, all summed up in Justice Douglas's

"underground" substantive due process case because its equal protection rationale
seems so unappealing).
18
' I do not mean to suggest by this that Skinner was argued or briefed as a case
involving race discrimination. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 235 n.94 (1991) (arguing that Skinner
"did not (facially, at least) involve racial discrimination"). Instead, my point is that
without Nazi racism raising the risk that a eugenics statute could be used to perpetuate
the "dominant group," the case might well have been decided the other way, given the
Court's prior holding in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The risk that the statutory
terms themselves may also have reflected racist ideology, see supra note 177, if known,
would only have reinforced fears that the statute would be put to racist ends in
America.
184 Typical readings of Skinner tend to reduce the opinion's "rationale" to
"establish [ing] the basis for 'fundamental right' analysis under the due process and
equal protection guarantees." NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.27, at 797.
185 See BORK, supra note 163, at 63-64 (reading Skinner as a fundamental rights case,
and therefore, an illegitimate exercise ofjudicial power).
186
See supra notes 163, 165, 167 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 178 (discussing Buck v. Bel~ 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ).
188
See supra notes 166, 167, 173 and accompanying text.

1997]

MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

1443

reference to procreation as "fundamental" to the race-transformed
from a statement of fact to a statement of constitutional method.
Our reading of Skinner thus warns us almost immediately that
courts' sense of their job description has changed. Once upon a
time, fact and holding, rather than method, provided the organizing
principle of constitutional law. Open up a constitutional law treatise
of the 1890s or the 1920s and compare that treatise to one of today:
you will be stunned at the concreteness of its conceptual categories.
You will find early equal protection law divided up into "Territorial
Classification," "Corporations and Individuals," and "Public Utilities
and Carriers," while the Commerce Clause is partitioned among
"Vessels," "Regulation of Ports and Harbors," and "Pilotage," among
other things. 189 No common law court would have put cases about
criminal appeals and marriage certificates and sterilization all in one
conceptual box. Today, we do: They are called "fundamental rights"
cases, 190 and they are so called, not because they share facts or
holdings, but because they share a method and a peculiarly modern
approach toward constitutional issues.
The tendency to read Skinner as constitutional methodology is
more than simply a question of style or rhetoric-it reflects a
changing image of how legal categories should be built. The term
"fundamental rights" has a very rich jurisprudential meaning and a
long constitutional history. 191
But our modern category of
"fundamental rights" differs quite substantially from earlier
understandings. Today, a student who described a death penalty or
takings case as a case about "fundamental rights" might fail her
constitutional law exam-not because the rights to liberty and
property are not fundamental in jurisprudential or other senses, but

189
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20228, 580-85 (4th ed. 1927); see also WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 287-300 (2d ed. 1930) (including a
variety of categories under the "commerce power" including "Base Ball," "Cab
Service," and "Driving Sheep across State Lines").
1
The subject matter of modern "fundamental rights" cases is notoriously diverse.
See supra notes 156-64 (describing cases including those concerning travel, abortion,
criminal appeals, sterilization, race, marriage, voting, welfare, and contraception).
191
Numerous opinions, decided long before Skinner, referred to "fundamental"
rights or interests. Typically, of course, the Court was referring to property or contract
rights. See, e.g., Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 456 (1919) ("[I)t is
essential to the protection of the fundamental rights of the property owner that ... he
have notice .... "); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to preserve and protect fundamental rights
long recognized under the common law system").
9{)
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because the doctrinal label would be wrong. The doctrinal label
would be wrong because, in modern constitutional law, the term
"fundamental rights" requires a conclusion not only that the right has
a certain character and that it has triggered a similar "scrutiny" in the
past, but also, crucially, that it is not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution itself.
As I have said before, all this could be coincidence, but it seems
difficult to believe that such a doctrine-one that openly
acknowledges the dangers of judging-does not reflect a changing
ideal of law and courts. The "fundamental rights" rule acknowledges
not only that doctrine is "made" (out of prior texts), but also that it
may as well be "made up." As every law student knows, the doctrinal
category "fundamental rights" cannot be described without
considering the possibility that the Court has no business identifying
such rights. Indeed, casebooks introduce students to the concept by
warning them that there is something false about the entire
enterprise-that courts simply identify "personal freedoms and
declare them 'rights. '" 192 Indeed, without this flavor of illegitimacy,
there would be little to bind "fundamental rights" cases together; the
category's theory of sameness depends upon the fear of doctrinal
failure.
If we can see courts' self-consciousness in the content of the
category, it also emerges in the way a case like Skinner is read. Skinner
becomes a case not only about the lack of constitutional text, but the
increasing importance of the Court's own texts. The common law
ideal imagined doctrinal rules as the distillation of precedent,
transcending the words used by a court. As Judge Posner has noted,
"[w]e are not afraid that we would lose the meaning of negligence if
we put it in different words from those used by Learned Hand, or
William Prosser, or some other authoritative expositor of the
concept." 193 By contrast, our category of fundamental rights is tied to
its "particular verbal formulation." 194 To use any different adjective,
or to describe the right involved at a different level of specificity, is to
192 DANIELA. FARBERET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (1993). A leading constitutional law treatise makes no bones about it: "All that can be said with certainty is that a
majority of the Supreme Court Justices have selected a group of individual civil
liberties which do not have a clear textual basis in the Constitution or its Amendments
and declared those rights to be 'fundamental."' NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116,
§ 11. 7, at 404; see also NAGEL, supra note 1, at 196 ("The principal characteristic of a
fundamental interest appears to be that the Court calls the interest fundamental.").
19' RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 248 ( 1990).
194 /d.
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extinguish the possibility of applying the doctrine. Indeed, if a court
today were to apply the "fundamental rights" doctrine without using
that particular phrase, it is doubtful that the resulting opinion would
be read or classified as a "fundamental rights" case.
If one doubts that there is anything particularly "modern" about
this shifting sense of the doctrinal art, all one has to do is to take the
modern grammar and place it in an earlier age. For decades, the
Court anchored its constitutional jurisprudence in the "police
power." 195 No one argued at the time (indeed, it seems almost absurd
to contemplate) that we would lose the police power if it were
described in any different way. The "police power" aspired to a
conceptualism dependent upon a class of factual and legal
circumstances in which courts would defer to the exercise of state
power. 196 Today, when we explain the "police power" to our students,
we do not pick up the dictionary and point to the plain meaning of
"police." Instead, we offer examples of cases that fall within the core
meaning of the concept-examples of quarantine laws and inspection
measures. We do this instinctively, unreflectively, as if we knew that
the term did not obtain its meaning from the dictionary definitions of
its components, but that it aspires to a conceptualism built upon an
older ideal in which doctrine is something distilled, rather than
expressed, in fact or holding. 197
When we read a case like Skinner for its embrace of "fundamental
rights," we accept a changing image of the virtues and vices of
judging. In a common law world, law is both permanent and
transcendent; in a modern law world, it is assumed to be both
contingent and potentially illegitimate. In a common law world,
authority and legitimacy depend upon courts' ability to transmit and
perpetuate an unwritten tradition by marrying law and life in
holdings; 198 in a modern world, authority and legitimacy depend upon
methodological certainty. In a common law world, where courts

See supra note 56.
Indeed, as Morton Horwitz tells us, the "police power" derived from common
law concepts. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 28 ("During the 1870s and 1880s, police
power analysis was regarded as largely derivable from categories developed in the
common law of nuisance.").
197
See Meyer, supra note 92, at 432 (noting that in this "Blackstonian tradition,
because the authority oflaw lies outside the judge's words, opinions ... are measured
against the reason and general principles that emanate from all past decisions, bound
together as a coherent whole").
198
See id. at 465 ("Law, from the standpoint of the common law judge, is the
coherence, sense, and significance of a set of human actions.").
195

196
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imagine themselves as the conveyors of precedent, rather than the
"writers" of text, categories are shaped in the image of precedent; 199 in
the modern world, where courts imagine themselves as text-writers,
law is what courts have "said."
Here, as in my other examples, we see doctrine struggling to
acknowledge its critics, but, at the same time, leaving room for more
traditional ideals. Drawing boundaries like "fundamental rights" not
only acknowledges critique, but also cabins it. If the "fundamental
rights" cases are the ones in which courts risk "making" law
illegitimately, that means that somewhere, outside the category, there
are cases where a determinate, clear, constitutional text governs. In
this way, the doctrine embraces the critique (potential illegitimacy)
and, at the same time, holds out hope for a legitimate doctrine built
upon a self-applying Constitution.
As we have seen earlier, however, there is a price to be paid for
this kind of reading, a price exacted in something more than the
dullness of a style that is "methodological [ly] obsess [ed]. "200 Every
time the Court must draw the line between the "fundamental rights"
cases and others, it must not only choose sides, but must also choose
between institutional ideals. When a litigant asks a court to recognize
an unenumerated right, the court must not only weigh the parties'
arguments and the demands of prior cases, but must also contend
with the potential institutional consequences of its choice. If this
choice is inevitable in some sense, the question remains whether it is
best accomplished when the institutional choice is embedded within
doctrine-when courts are not asking the question "how will this
change our role?" or "is there another, better institution to decide

199 Take, for example, the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects upon
commerce-frequently cited as a classic example of nineteenth-century formalism,
based on the case of United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). If one reads
carefully, the Court in E. C. Knight never set out the distinction in those terms, nor did
it use such a distinction as a test or doctrinal standard. Instead the adjective "direct"
served to distinguish prior holdings. See, e.g., id. at 15-16 ("In Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown
v. Maryland, and other cases often cited, the state laws, which were held inoperative,
were instances of direct interference with ... interstate ... commerce .... ").
Although our modern textual approach tends to focus us on the specific terms used"direct interference"-nineteenth-century treatises did not understand the case in
these terms. E.C. Knight does not appear under a separate category for "direct" or
"indirect" effects on commerce, but, instead, under the heading of an "anti-trust" case.
See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 189, at 34~5 (discussing E.C. Knight under "AntiTrust," rather than "Commerce" heading).
200
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 99.
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this case?", but, instead, whether the case falls within the modern
doctrinal category we know as "fundamental rights."
The danger here is that courts will confuse the real-life
consequences of their decisions with their own institutional identity.
What matters more in convincing us that Skinnerwas rightly decided:
Justice Douglas's use of the term "fundamental," or the dangers, so
apparent at the time, that the Oklahoma statute could risk the
biological eradication of undesirable minorities? Modern doctrinal
readings tend to steer us away from history and toward the opinion's
text, telling us to "read" the case as one about "fundamental rights."
This, of course, moves us quickly toward questions about judicial
legitimacy and away from the lived consequences of decision. Once
the label "fundamental rights" is invoked, we do not ask about the
persons likely to be sterilized or their relationship to the "dominant"
group; we do not ask about the institutional consequences of a ruling
that would leave such decisions in the hands of legislatures. Instead,
we focus on questions about the Court itself, its methods and its
legitimacy.
Should Skinner arise again, I doubt seriously that the public would
tolerate a court that refused to exercise judicial review to strike down
a similar sterilization statute. And yet, despite this consensus, Skinner
continues to draw us into bone-numbingly familiar debates about the
legitimacy of judicial review. 201 We are back again to a question I have
asked before: whether a constitutional rhetoric that seeks to tame the
Court's critics is more likely to find answers to questions about the
Court than about those who must live by its decisions. The Supreme
Court began this century with a constitutional arrogance we now
know as "Lochner." Could all of our work against such arrogance risk a
new constitutional narcissism?

V. INSTITUTIONAL IDEALS AND THE DEMANDS OF DECISION
These doctrinal histories are modern, not because the words that
they use are peculiarly modern, not because the "layered-look" reveals
a modern reverence for the bureaucratic or academic, and not
because judges seek to hide the Constitution from the people. 202

201
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 163, at 64 (criticizing Skinners reading of the Equal
Protection Clause as starting down the road to situations where the Court "cannot
avoid legislating the justices' personal views").
202
Cf supra Part I (citing other work embracing these factors as at least a partial
explanation of the formulaic quality of modern constitutional doctrine).
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These stories are modern because they reflect a distinctively modern
struggle in which doctrinal argument tries to contend with a dying
common law ideal.
In a sense, this should seem surprising because it reverses the
traditional relationship between doctrine and theory by suggesting
that theory-what we believe courts to be and doctrine to do-may
become hardened within doctrinal categories. 203 On the other hand,
from a slightly different vantage point, it seems quite natural indeed.
For, once we come to see that the identity of concepts, their
sameness, "is conferred on objects by their being held in the embrace
of a theoretical structure,"204 it becomes easier to see how institutional
ideals might become embedded within doctrine. From such a
perspective, writing doctrine is not only a process of arbitrarily
choosing categories, but of rewriting with each choice prevalent
stories of what doctrine is and courts are.
A. Langdell Redux?

The standard understanding that modern constitutional doctrine
has traded in one set of formalisms for another is correct, but
incomplete. It is surely right in the sense that we have categories that
look increasingly formulaic. It is also right in the sense that, for all of
doctrine's supposed modern bow toward a more "realistic" outlook
(its embrace of perspective, candor about its weaknesses, and
unembarrassed acceptance of lawmaking), we have recreated, in
many ways, the very kind of essentialist discourse that realist scholars
deplored. Where we once looked for the essence of the "police
power," today we look for the essence of "compelling interests." We
have traded in one set of hopes of transcendence for another. Once
transcendence was sought in history, stability, and stare decisis; today,
it is sought in prediction, candor, and clarity of textual expression. In
these senses, the classical style remains steadfastly with us, albeit
wearing new armor.
Even so, the new doctrinal orthodoxy differs from the old. It is
very difficult to translate our modern doctrinal grammar-turning
••• If I am right, then we can expect to see this process continue as popularized
versions of yesterday's academic fads become tomorrow's embedded doctrinal forms.
I suspect that the "new wave" of this doctrinalism will come from law and economics.
See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F. 3d 1536, 1551 (6th Cir. 1996) (borrowing the language
of economics--of market failure, "collective action," and "negative externalities"-in a
First Amendment patronage case).
204 DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 59 (discussing the work ofW.V. Quine).
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the "police power" into a "compelling police interest"-without
realizing that something has changed. What my doctrinal histories
have tried to show is that sometimes we can catch a glimpse, on the
face of doctrine, of changing ideals of the institution. Those who
study institutions regularly from the vantage point of a "foreigner" are
well aware of the ways in which an institution's self-image is reflected
in the concepts it embraces. Anthropologist Mary Douglas argues
that every societal institution "needs a formula that founds its
rightness in reason and in nature." 205 These formulas represent a set
of analogies from which the institution creates its stock concepts, the
categories in which it "thinks."206 Because of the transaction costs of
intellectual effort, these analogies become the "default position,"
resorted to without thought and even in the face of changing
realities. In Douglas's terms, doctrine-in the move from the police
power to clear law-reflects a shift in the structures of doctrinal
legitimacy and normalcy. We have formalisms that are new, not
because they are any less formal (formalism is inevitable within
doctrinalism), and not because courts are trying to evade the people
or have borrowed the style of academics, but because the new
formalisms depend upon a different metaphor of the "natural legal
order," one in which courts have given themselves permission to treat
their opinions as texts, to see their job as a matter of social
arbitration, to acknowledge with candor that law is uncertain.
Douglas's theory does much to explain why we have seen that
doctrine both absorbs critique and then cabins it. If her theory is
right, and institutions seek to mold the unpalatable into sustaining
images, then that may help to explain the conflicting signals sent by
modern constitutional rhetoric. If doctrine had truly sought to
embrace the modernist critique-law's indeterminacy or relativity or

205
/d. at 45; see also id. at ll2 ("Any institution that is going to keep its shape needs
to gain legitimacy by distinctive grounding in nature and in reason: then it affords to
its members a set of analogies with which to explore the world and with which to
justifY the naturalness and reasonableness of the instituted rules, and it can keep its
identifiable continuing form. Any institution then starts to control the memory of its
members; it causes them to forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image,
and it brings to their minds events which sustain the view of nature that is complementary to itself. It provides the categories of their thought, sets the terms for selfknowledge, and fixes identities.").
206
See id. at 45 (noting that "the entrenching of an institution is essentially an
intellectual process").
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social dependency-it would have had to make itself "irrelevant."207
Instead, it used its characteristic methods, the creation of hard-edged
categories, to bound the critique. A doctrinal rhetoric of "unclear
law" bows to the age's meaning skepticism but, in the end, posits that
there is, somewhere, clear law to be found. 208 A doctrinal rhetoric of
"perspective" bows to the notion that "it is all relative," but still leaves
room for courts to hold that only some perspectives-the reasonable
ones-count. 209 A doctrinal rhetoric of social "interests" bows to the
notion that law is no longer autonomous, but still leaves enormous
room for the court to define interests as fundamental or important or
compelling, meanings that have no analogue outside of law. The
move from critique to hard-edged category leaves space where
something like the common law ideal still lives-where law can be
clear, objective, and autonomous-alongside a rhetoric that is
distinctly more likely to acknowledge doctrine's weaknesses.
The danger is not that modern constitutional doctrine has lost
positive features of the common law ideal. (Indeed, that ideal is alive
and well, and is experiencing something of a revival in academic
circles.) 210 The danger is that doctrine's struggle with institutional
self-criticism tends to make real-life decisions dependent upon the
resolution of difficult, and recurring, theoretical disputes. As Mary
Douglas puts it, the natural metaphors chosen by institutions pick and
choose "allies and opponents," which leads to a standard repertoire of
"future relations" between the two. 211 Consider the fate of the clear
law rule. As we have seen, to apply the doctrine (and decide the
case), the court often finds itself mired in deep and difficult
theoretical questions about "what is law" and "how clear must clear
be." 212 The boundaries of clear law must not only do the work of
decisionmaking, they must decide by trying to bound the
indeterminacy critique that the doctrine assumes. Similar problems
are posed by rules of perspective. To apply the doctrine, the court
must not only find the relevant interests and expectations, it must
adopt the proper "perspective" or "methodology" with respect to

207 GILMORE, supra note 5, at 13 (enunciating the familiar scholarly critique that
"the doctrine which may be found enshrined in case report and treatise is neither
important nor relevant").
208 See supra Part II.
209
See supra Part III.
210 See supra note 16 (noting this revival).
211 DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 63.
212 See supra Part II.
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those social interests, a struggle that asks it to address difficult
theoretical questions about whether and when law must defer to life
and when it must command otherwise. 213 Rules of perspective must
not only help the court to decide individual cases, they must do so by
bounding the critique that inspired them-by placing boundaries on
the notion that the law is a matter of relativism and social deference.
Finally, consider concepts such as "fundamental rights" in the equal
protection context. To apply the doctrine, the court must not only
struggle with the generality with which to describe the right claimed,
but also with the legitimacy of judicial review itself. 214 Again, this
category must not only help the court to choose, it must do so by
confronting the critique of judicial activism and law creation
embedded within the concept. Staving off institutional criticism by
incorporating that criticism within doctrine means that the doctrine
will continue to generate the very theoretical controversies that
inspired it-over and over again.

if rracttce:
n...
.
'T''h
B• 'T''h
1 , e "B ony Structure "215 o
1 , e Case
If we are truly realists, we will acknowledge that doctrine has
successfully resisted the best, and most pretentious, intellectual efforts
of this century by bending its critics' claims to new and formalistic
ends.
We will remember Karl Llewellyn's insistence that the
Constitution is an institution, a practice, and a means of governing. 216
We will also hear what the foreign observers have told us, that
institutions "think" ideas that sustain themselves and, in doing so,
inevitably seek to mold the ideas of their critics into fare more
palatable to perceived institutional needs. 217
If we are to avoid romantic yearnings for an earlier age, and the
familiar arguments that this yearning spawns, we must understand
m See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
215
See TwiNING, supra note 62, at 176 (quoting Karl Llewellyn).
216
See Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 17.
217 One commentator notes:
Institutions systematically direct individual memory and channel our
perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorize. They fix
processes that are essentially dynamic, they hide their influence, and they
rouse our emotions to a standardized pitch on standardized issues. Add to all
this that they endow themselves with rightness and send their mutual
corroboration cascading through all the levels of our information system. No
wonder they easily recruit us into joining their narcissistic self-contemplation.
DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 92.
2"
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doctrine's real institutional limitations. Consider, for a moment, the
site for doctrine's creation-the "case." 218
Relative to other
institutions, such as markets or legislatures, adjudication is a
demanding institution. It requires decision at the same time it
enjoins passivity. Unlike other legal institutions, such as markets or
legislatures, courts typically have no choice to not decide. 219 Someone
will, in the end, win or lose. At the same time, courts have little
power to set the agenda of their decisions. As Neil Komesar has put
it, a ·~udge can do nothing until a litigant takes the initiative." 220 It is
the litigant's offering of facts and law to which the court must
respond.
Faced with the imperative to decide in an atmosphere where
there is little ability to control what is to be decided, courts strive
mightily to control what they can-the reasons that they give for their
decisions. Perhaps, then, it should not be surprising to find that the
reasons often appear hard-edged and formalistic. In a sense, the only
ideas that adjudication can possibly use are ideas that can be placed
in the service of decision (as opposed to knowing, understanding, or
reaching agreement). 221 The "piled adjectives" now betray their
attractiveness. The pile seems to offer a way to decide-if the law is
clear, if the right is fundamental, if the perspective is reasonable, then

218
However changed by modern litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the development of
public law litigation); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword, Public
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1982) (same), the structure of
"the case" remains the dominant scene for the performance of adjudication in
America.
219 See, e.g., BOBBITI, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that cases "require a decision, not
a calculation or an interpretation, or even a passionate conviction"); EISENBERG, supra
note 100, at 159 (noting that even when asked a novel issue, courts will not turn
claimants away, telling them that because of the novelty, there was no law at the time
and, therefore, the case cannot be decided); cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) ( 1962) (recounting ways in
which courts exercise "passive" virtues to avoid decision).
220 KOMESAR, supra note 21, at 128; see id. at 125 ("UJudges are far less able to
initiate decision-making than legislators. Legislators can resolve a social issue without
anyone officially and formally bringing the issue to their attention .... Judges must
await action brought by moving parties, often private parties.").
221 This is what, in the end, distinguishes the law-talk of opinionwriting from the
law-talk of legislatures. Juxtapose the Cong;ressional Record with a Supreme Court
opinion. Both "make" law, but read quite differently because the institutions demand
different kinds of decisions which, in turn, lead to different decisional narratives.
Legislature-talk is the talk of consensus-building; opinionwriting is the talk of choice.
Self-legitimation, within the Congress, means a speech that moves the public, not one
that would win a case in the Supreme Court.
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the case is "decided"-won or lost. Once the illusive legal "property"
is found (the "fundamentality" of the right or the "compellingness" of
the interest), the case's choice appears self-evident. (And, indeed, it
is in some sense inevitable since all the normative choices have been
pre-packaged into the original dispositional proposition.) 222 This
does not mean that the reasons announced in the opinion in fact
decide cases-they may not. It does mean that doctrine's form will
always be placed in the service of, and molded by, the court's need to
decide.
This institutional understanding goes a long way toward
explaining why the modernist critique never really had a chance to
transform doctrine in any fundamental way without also changing the
institutional demands of adjudication. 223 It also goes a long way
toward explaining why doctrine took what it did from its critics.
There are plenty of critical insights that doctrine ignored: Modern
doctrine does not adopt empirical tests for hypothetical verdicts; it
does not announce a principle for every counter-principle (or at least
it does not try to do this); and it does not preface its holdings by
warning that "whatever follows is inherently political." Why not?
Because to adopt any of these principles as doctrine is to undermine
courts' self-perceived identity relative to other institutions. A court
that decides based on the latest Gallup poll does not distinguish itself
from a political consultants' committee.
A court that sends
hypothetical verdicts to an outside research firm does not distinguish
itself from a university sociology department. A court that borrows
from Jack Balkin's school of point-counterpoint224 does not
distinguish itself from a debating society. Doctrine makes itself in an
institutional image and it will borrow only those forms that it
perceives will sustain that image.

222
See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 953
(1985) (arguing that the concept of the "reasonable man" packs into itself, from the
start, normative decisions); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 596, 636-37, 645-46 (1981) (making a similar
argument about prepacking in a different context). For an in-depth look at how this
happens in the common law context, see Nourse, supra note 19, at 1384-89.
223 Where the structure of litigation has changed, see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585 (1983), doctrine has had to make enormous strides to keep
up.
224 See J. M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 3
(1986) (arguing that legal thinking should be "viewed dialectically as a continuing
series of struggles between various sets of opposed ideas").
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C. A "Living Doctrine"

Our best hope of resisting the standard arguments and replies
may simply be to accept the institutional reality. Let us embrace the
embarrassing and recognize that formalism will remain as long as the
institutional realities of the case remain the same and that rhetoric
alone cannot do away with the "requirement of a decision." 225 Let us
focus on the ways in which doctrine "lives" in the world. The greater
danger is not that the Court is boring or impenetrable, but that its
decisions forsake "lived relations" for institutional purity. Our
categories must aspire to a more modest, and therefore more helpful,
image-an image that is incremental and dynamic, one in which
doctrine aspires to recognize that every category reflects a judgment
of alternatives about a set of relationships, relationships between the
Court's past and its future, between the litigants themselves, and
between the Court and other institutional decisionmakers.
The realists' own philosophical patron saint,John Dewey, laid the
groundwork for a dynamic understanding of legal relationships when
he urged that we temper our search for knowledge built on
description. In his book, How We Think, Dewey contrasts two kinds of
conceptual knowledge. 226 The first is dispositional. When asked to
describe "metal," we offer properties or qualities of metal:
"[s]moothness, hardness, glossiness, and brilliancy."227
Dewey
contrasts this understanding with one in which metal is not defined
by its properties, but through its chemical relationships and
"interaction in constituting other substances."228 He urges that "our
conceptions attain a maximum of definite individuality" if "they show
how things depend upon one another or influence one another,
instead of expressing the qualities that objects possess statically."229
Metal is no longer defined by brittleness, but as "any chemical
element that enters into combination with oxygen so as to form a
base." 230 Dewey concludes by claiming that such knowledge allows us
to "lay hold of the dynamic ties that hold things together in a
.
Iy c h angmg
. process. ,231
contmuous

225
226
227
228
229
2!!0

231

BOBBITI, supra note 14, at 39 (emphasis omitted).
JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 131-34 (1910).
/d. at 133.
/d. at 134.
/d.
/d.

/d.
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One need not embrace Dewey's hope for a science of relational
understandings 232 to see that his analysis holds out hope that we may
cultivate intellectual habits that strive toward understanding the
dynamic relationships that bind us together. We have all had
experiences similar to sitting in an optician's chair and "knowing"
whether lens number one is "better or worse" than lens number two
without having the vaguest idea about how the images differ optically.
Litigation suffers from similar limitations. Sometimes it is far easier
to decide whether claim number one or claim number two presents a
better relationship between the parties, a better relationship to the
court's prior decisions and its future ones, and a better relationship
between courts and other legal institutions, 233 than it is to articulate
the essential differences between the claims. Should we give up
making the right decision simply because we do not know the precise
measurements that make the decision right, even if our reasons,
however inarticulate, are good enough to choose among alternatives
and thus to "live by"? Or should we simply recognize that, if courts
fail in their obligation to articulate reasons, this failure may be
corrected over time, while a failure to make the right decision could
force people to live in ways that are far from easily repaired?

232
The skeptic in us all will hesitate at this point and argue that all relationships
can be redescribed as dispositions. That is true, but it does not eliminate the
possibility that some ways of thinking may be more "dynamic" than others. Asking
whether and how the law should regulate the relationship between state and citizen is
a different question than asking whether certain "fundamental rights" should be
protected. The former question suggests an intellectual operation in which we
"value," "create," or "imagine" the relationship; the latter suggests a search for a legal
object with a particular property. To the extent the latter seems to suggest that there
is something to be found, it invites a backward-looking search for something "prior"whether it is a legal concept or a meaning. To the extent the former seems to suggest
that we need to "create" this relationship, it sends our search in the opposite direction,
inviting engagement and commitment.
233 This focus on "relational" understandings is precisely what the modern doctrinal grammar tends to resist. The three-prong test actually fragments the key
relational questions by drawing our attention first to one side of the case, then to the
other, leaving the "relational" elements to be summed up in the amorphous and
ubiquitous "nexus requirement." Moreover, the focus on textual expression tends to
turn our attention to the court's own language rather than the parties' dispute,
placing the judges-not the parties-at the center of the legal universe. Finally, the
law's self-consciousness of its own creation tends to obscure doctrine's understanding
of its relationship with the past, veiling analogy's modest virtues with a heavy-lidded
textuality. Gone from view is the overarching question of the state's relationship to its
citizens; instead, the only relationship we are likely to see is the relationship of an
object and its attributes-of a law to its clarity, of rights to their fundamentality, or of
the parties to their expectations.
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I am not arguing that we should not care about the reasons courts
give, but only that a methodological focus may strike an unhealthy
balance between rhetoric and result. To press formalism toward a
modest dynamism requires a doctrine placed in the service of those
for whom doctrine must work, not to assuage judges' or scholars'
fears, but the fears of the parties and the rest of us who must live by it.
In Charles Dickens's Hard Times, 234 Gradgrind asked his pupil Bitzer
to define "horse." Bitzer responded: "Quadruped. Gramnivorous.
Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve
incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries sheds hoofs
too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron." "Now," says
Gradgrind to the pupil he calls "girl number twenty," "[y]ou know
what a horse is. "235 Of course, this is far from a horse. "No horseman
ever rode a 'gramnivorous quadruped,"' "[n]o gambler ever bet on
one," and "[n]o sculptor ever 'dreamed one out of stone."'236 The
people who must use the horse-for their art, for their vice, or simply
for transportation-are "involved in a living relation to a living
animal," and that relation will be reflected in the categories they use
Lest constitutional courts become
to describe the animal. 237
Gradgrindian, they should be careful to remember that doctrine
serves to guide action in the world, not the other way around.
Consider what might have been the doctrine of Skinner238 if the
Court had asked whether the Constitution would permit a lived
relationship of the kind the state sought-if it would permit a
majority to threaten the biological eradication of an undesirable
minority.
Consider how we might have understood Skinners
relationship to the Court's past holdings if the Court had more
openly acknowledged that Nazi experimentation had called into
question the eugenic assumptions of Buck v. Bele39 Or consider how
we might have appreciated the Court's exercise of judicial power if
the Court had justified its assertion of power by noting that the
alternative-leaving the question to the political departments-posed
greater dangers, dangers that had ended, already, in world war. Even
if these are contested judgments, they are lived ones, far richer than
the ofihand phrases with which Skinner is now associated.
CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Oxford Univ. Press 1955) (1854).
/d. at5.
2' 6 jOHN CIARDI & MILLER WILUAMS, HOW DOES A POEM MEAN? 1 (2d ed. 1975).
2' 7 /d. at 2 .
... 316 u.s. 535 (1942) .
••• 274 u.s. 200 (1927).
2"
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Appreciating the real institutional limits of doctrine is not a
matter of resignation, but a moral consideration in and of itself. 240
Doctrine's words "are not just for fun and mental exercise."241 A poet
may misuse the word "mere" and be branded a failure, and a scientist
may misinterpret the word "mere" and be decried as unintelligible,
but whether and how a jury hears the word "mere" may mean, quite
literally, someone's life. 242 We need to appreciate that "[w]ords
cannot be isolated from the deeds they perform ... [n]ot only
because they represent or reflect on actions but because they
themselves, literally, are actions." 243 Even if we know that the line
between politics and law is far from clear, we must remember that
"[i] t is institutions which validate the Words, not the Words which
validate the institutions."244 In the end, I think it takes a foreigner to
our doctrinal culture to remind us that "[t]he most profound
decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such, but by
individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions."245

240 See HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 281 (Crossroad 1986) (1975)
(recounting the Aristotelian idea that "knowledge of a dynamic kind" is knowledge
with a "purpose" to "determine and guide action").
241
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Ununitten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 211,
215 (1988); see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986)
(discussing how the legal interpretation of an act leads to punishment, violence, and
pain).
242 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF jUDGES 56-59 (1993) (discussing
the degree to which the Supreme Court's decision in a death penalty case depended
upon its interpretation of the term "mere" in a "mere sympathy" jury instruction).
245
PAUL DE MAN, Shelley Disfigured, in THE RHETORIC OF ROMANTICISM 93, 102-03
(1984), quoted in Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW, supra
note 43, at 275, 304.
244
Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 17.
245
DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 124.

